The history of American federalism in the twentieth century falls into thrt'c distinct periods. The era of.post-Reconstructioll federalism, which hegall in the late nilleteenth celltury, ended in the years after 1 929 when a sltattcri11g series of domestic a11d international crises combined with rhe innovative presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt to reoriem the nation's laws, politics, and institutions. The resulting "New Deal Order .. lasted for allllost fivL· decades before crumbling in the ce!ltury's last quarter when massive social, cultural, economic, and political changes cornhined with rite dralllatizing presidency of Rollaid Rea,,an to begin reorientin« rhe system once a«ain. Ar century's end, rhe nat::,re and ~·ourse of that,-,emcrging era rem,~m-d unsettled.
I. TIIE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF AMFRIC:AN FEDFRALISI\I
With a de facto default rule favoring decentralization, American federalism is a governmental systelll based 011 the cx1stenn' of independenr political Power at both stare ,111d national levels. Its essence lies, first, 111 rhe institutional tensions that the Constitution structured between the two levels of" I l · I I 1· I . . I . ,-,overnrnent, anL seconL, Ill t 1e comp ex processes o L eus1on ma ,lllg th at the Constitution established to maintain satisfactory relario11s lx-rweell th e two levels. Those processes were cornplex because they involved, on the national side, three distinct and counrcrpoised hra11Clws of govcrnmem and, on rhe state side, a growing multitude of equal, independem, and often conflicting governing units. In theory, ,md somcrimes ill practice, national power served to foster economic integration and efficiency, faC1l-1tare the development and enforcement of desirable un1forlll standards, enable the people to deal effectively with problems national and international in scope, protect the security and general welfare of the nation as a Whole, and safeguard liberty by check111.l.!; the potential tyranny of local ftJajorities. Conversely, also in theory and sometimes in practice, state power /idll 'cml A. P111n!I.J1: served to foster economic innovation and dficiency, nourish social and cultural diversity, encourage democratic participation, facilitate the adoption of narrow solutions tailored to special local problems, and safeguard liberty by checking the potential tyranny of national majorities.
As a matter of historical developmem, American federalism gave rise to a dynamic and fluid political system in which competing groups and coalitions struggled for control of the nation's diverse centers of governmental power and used constitutional arguments to place decision-making authority over contested issues in the level and branch of government that seemed, at any given time, most likely to support their values, interests, and aspirations. The claim of ''state sovereignty," for example, which I imi red or denied the authority of the national government, served a variety of diverse groups over the centuries: Jeffersonian Democrats in the r 790s, New England Federalists during the War of r 8 r 2, South Carolina nu! lifiers in the r 8 _',OS, Northern ami-slavery civil libertarians before the Civil War, and then from Reconstruction to the late twentieth century those who clefrnded racial segregation and disenfranchisement. The pressures generated by successive waves of such diverse groups and coalitions -themselves the products of relentless social and economic change -drove the system's evolution. Certain widely sharl'd cultural cornmitml'nts -to republican government, the common law, religious freedom, private property, and individual liberty -combined with the idea of a written Constitution and the reality of institutionally divided powers to constrain and channel that evolution. But the system's operations and assumptions continued to shift as changing cultural values, social conditions, economic innovations, institutional practices, legal theories, judicial decisions, and constitutional amu1dments blurred or redrew the lines of state and federal authority.
In that long and complex historical process, one issue repeatedly t'ml.'fged as pivotal: what institutions or procedures existed to settll' disputes ovl'r the respective spheres of state and federal authority; Americans debated t!wr issue vigorously for eight decades and then, in the Civil War and its three co11stiturional amemlmcnts, settled it in part. Thl' national govcrnmuit, not thl' states, held dispositivc authority. Neither thl' war nor its resulting constitutional amendments, however, answered two further questions: which branch or branches of the federal governml'nt held that authority) And how was the authority to be exercisecP Much of the history of American li:dcralisrn after the Civil War revolved around the contested answers given to those two questions, as the three f<.-deral branches -each responding to the values and intnests that dominatcxl it at any given timl' -adopted diverse and somcrirncs rn111lini11g policies that kd them to defer to state prerogatives on some occasions and trump them on others.
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Indeed, as American life became increasingly centralized and homogenized in the late nineteenth and twenricth centuries, many of the distinctive and authentically "local" values and inrerests thar had originally givL·n the fr·deral system its embedded social meaning withered or became suspect. Some blended into emerging and widely shared national values and imerests; others grew attenuated or disappeared entirely; a fi_·w -most obviously, rhose involving racial oppression --were explicitly repudiated by new national majorities and constitutional arnemlmcnts. The result was that the ingrained cultural understandings of the late eighteemh and early nit1tteenrh centuries gradually disintegrated, the lived social meaning of Amnican fcxleral ism grew more amorphous and contestable, and the distincrivcly local values and interests that the system protected increasingly appeared either narrow and parochial or vague and abstract. Over the course of the twentieth cemury the idea of American federal ism as a normative concept -that the C:onstiturion set out clear I incs thar ddined and d isringu 1shed st atc and federal powers -grew ever more amorphous and manipulable.
Thus, the history of American k·deralism cannot be understood by focusing solely 011 constitutional provisions or theories of frdcral1srn. The Con-'ititution provided a sound framework of governmcllt and a shrewd system ot insr1tutionalized checks and balances, but it did nor draw bright or generally dcrerminative lines of aurhority between state and fi:deral power nor specify any particular "balance" between them. Similarly, theories of fr·dn-alisn1 provided a range of normative base! 1 nes, but their spn i fie In junctions WL-re invariably construed diversely and contested sharply. Indenl, conllict1ng views of federalism existed from the nation's bc;..'.inning, and the passing Years producL"d a smorgasbord of new variations, each inspired by and suf--fusL·d with the emerging values, interests, expccrations, and preconceptions of its advocates. The federal structure helped sustain rhe nation's cornmitrnult to Ii mired government, cultural diversity, and individual liberty, but Its history can be understood fully only by examining how and why its Practical operations evolved, its political si,~nificance shifted, its social const''-ILicnces unfolded, and its ideological contours pniodically eroded and reformed.
Since rhc early decades of the nineteenth cemury, the prevailing the-'.)? held that the C:rn1stirution esrablishnl a system of "dual federalism." 
I
pnnup cs arrri )Utcc to t 1e system were cw. 1c nat1011a governnient was one of limited and delegated powers only; the states were indePtndent sovereigns with exclusive authority over local matters reserved to th en1 by the Tenth Amendmcnt; and the powers of the two governments Wer,, 1· . I " I " I . l I I k ' 1 1111tec to separate sp 1eres anc rntcnc ec to serve as c 1cc ·s on one another.
l.C\O Et!1l'urd i\. Pm·ccll. Jr. Although the actual practice of American frderalism was always more complicated than the thl:'ory of dual fr·dl:'ralisrn implil:'d, during the late ninctl'l'nth and C:',trly twentieth century fivl' acccll:'rating tkvelopmellts substa11tially rl:'shaped the systl:'m. First, spl:'ctacular revolutions 111 transportation and communications together with t!w ongoing processes of industrialization, urbanization, westward expansion, and economic CC:'ntralization remade American society. What in 1 789 had bl:'en a collection of geographically rooted, lornlly oriented, and culturally diversl:' island communities had by 1920 become an increasingly mobile, nationally oriented, and economically and culturally integrated nation. Ever widening areas oflifr Wl'IT corning to have national significance, and Americans from coast ro coast increasingly fi1ced similar problems that flooded beyond the ability of individual stares to remedy.
Second, the powerful ninl'teenth-cl:'ntury bl:'lief that the primary function of governml:'nt was to protect privatl:' property and economic ft-cl:'dorn was weakenmg. Since the Civil War govl:'rnments at all levels had become incrl:'asingly active in attempting to deal with the massive social disruptions that came with urbanization and industrialization. Repeatedly the states increased taxes and expandl:'d their activities, ll'gislating over a widening variety of social and economic problems and establishing administrative agencies to regulate railroads, insurance companies, and many other types of business. They raised their funding for local governments, for example, from barely $50 million in 1902 to almost $Goo million by 1927.
Third, the fcckral govu·nment was growing at an even more accelerated rate. Although the states still employed several times as many workl'rs and spent more than twicl' as much money as the federal government, thl' balance of power between the two was shifting. As C:'Conomic and cultural centralization proceeded, the political consl:'nsus that had tilted strongly toward decentralization in thl:' early ninC:'teL·nth Lentury was moving by century's end toward support of more and broader governml:'nt action at the national IC:'vcl. In 1 887 the fi::deral government began to USC:' its authority over interstate commerce to regulate the new national economy, and by the secoml decade of thL· twentieth century it had asserted extu1sive national control over interstate transportation and communications while subjecting orhn interstate husinl:'sses to an expanding variety of l1C:' W federal regulations.
Fourth, running against that nationalizing current, a vehl'mcnt ITaction against Reconstruction among white Americans had severely constrained thl' power of the federal govl:'rnment to protl:'ct the rights of African Americans. Notwithstanding thl' Civil War amendments, an informal national SC:'ttkmcnt in the century's last decades had succl:'ssfully rl:'defined most matters involving black civil and political rights as local issul:'s that propl'rly fell within the exclusive authority of thl' states. Increasingly, the cries of '/'he Co11rl.1. Federc1!is//l, tf/1{! the Feclel', d Co11slil11tio11. 1 c;2cJ 2DOCJ 1 .' > r "states' rights," "state sovereignty," and the "principles of federalism" were identified with the esrabl ishment and preservation of racial segregation and disenfranchisement.
Finally, the power of the federal judiciary was growing relative to that of' both Congress and the stares, and by the early twentieth cemury the l 1.S. Supreme Court had emerged as the ultimate -if still sharply contestl'llauthority or1 the law of both American f,,..deralism and the new national economy. The nation's commitmem to law and rhe ideal of'limitnl constitutional government had led Alllericans gradually to embrace rhe Court --"the Court" as they callle ro call it -and Hs umpiring role, while rhe srructure of the federal judiciary -like that of rhe exernrive branch bur unlike that of Congress -allowed the Court to act relatively quickly anc.l c.leusivdy. The Court deterlllined the exrenr to which any governlllenr could regulate business and property as well as the particular level of govern1rn:nt that could regulate them. On rhe former issue, it held that a narrow range of econornic activities "affrcted with a public interest" WL'IT subwct w L'xtensive regulation, bur chat most business and property rclllaincd "private" and subject only to minimal regulation. On the latter issue, it held that specific economic activities found to be "closely" or "directly" relarl'll to interstate collllllerce were national i11 scope and hl'l1ce subject to fi:c.leral control under the C:ornme1-ce Clause hut that rhe bulk of such activities remained local and subject to regulation only by the statL·s. As a gcnl'ral 111 atter, the Court's rulings gradually extended rhe powers of the fi:c.leral governmenr while restricting rhe power of the states to i11trudc imo the Workings of the burgeonrng national lllarket. To enforce its malllLrte, the Courr l"l·shaped the jurisdiction of rhc lower federal courts ro make them ll1ore effective instruments of national judicial authority, turning rl1L·m from disputes between private parties over issues of local law ro suits that challenged government action or raised issues ofnarional law. l11crcasi11gly, too, th e Court exercised its burgeoning power. I 11 Sl'VL'nty-one years up rn 1 8(,o enormously while curtailing thl: power of state legislatures. Both amendments gave thc American people a new and dirl:ct involvement in their national government, while the income tax provision allowcd the fedenil government to raise virtually uni imited amounts of money, paving the way for explosive growth in the future. The Supreme Court, too, had seemed willing to approve some widcning assertions of national power by stretching the limiting categories of business "affected with a public interest" and activities "closely" related to interstate commcrce. Most dramatic were the changes that followed American entry into World War I. Relying principally on their war powers, Congress and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson exercised unparalleled authority. They estab-1 ished national conscription, took control of the nation's transportation and communications systems, imposed tight rcstrictions on the distribution of food and fi.1d, asserted authority over relations betwcen labor and management, and expanded the fr:deral income tax system drastically. In addition, through the Espionage and Scdition Acts they prohibitcxl a variety of activities ~ including speech critical of the government~ that might interfere:: with the war effort. They criminalizcd, for example, "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" directed at thl' Constitution, thl' armcd forces, the government, or the flag.
1 Pcrhaps most arresting, by statute and then by constitutional amcndment Congress and the statcs prohibited the manufacture, salc, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United States. Ratified in 1 ') 19, thl' Eightcenth Amendment conferred on the federal government authority to enforce nationwide Prohibition and expanded its powcr into areas that had pt"l'viously been considered both local and private::.
The war challenp;ed the structure of post-Reconstruction federalism in other ways as well. Politically, it led to the adoption of yet another nationalizing constitutional amendment, the Nineteenth, which prohibited the states from denying the vote to women and conferrcd on Congrl'ss thl' power to enforcc its mandate. Institutionally, the war induccd thc Supreme Court to back away from its umpiring role and watch passively as Congress and the president exercised sweeping war powers. Socially, thl' war's proclaimed goal of making "the world safc for dcmocracy" even hinted at the possibility of change in the nation's racial status quo.
Although post-Reconstruction federalism trembled, it did not crumble::. The end of the war brought a suies of bitter labor strikcs, a brief but virulent Rc-d Scare, rcpl'ated outbrcaks of anti-black violence, rapidly rising prices followed by a short dcprl'ssion, and spreading resentment at the administration's continucd usl' and abusl' of its war powers. Those events destroyed Wartime unity, fragmc:ntcd Progressivism, and generated a powerful desire for a return to a more stable and tranquil order. 111 1920 the reaction ,1.;ave the Republicans control of both Congress and the prc·s1dency. With rhc help of returning prospnity, the Republicans mainrained thar hold for a decade, t"nsuring a government of" order, conservatism, business dorni11ario11, and minimal economic reguL1tion. Under their rule, Republicans annoumTd, America was entering a "New Era" of sustained LTonornic prog1Tss and prosperity. For almost a decade their promise seemed golden.
The national turnaround in 1 920 induced the Court ro JTassert its authority. In cautious dicta it began to suggest jll(liually enforceable limits on federal war powers, and in 192 r it invalidated un vagueness grounds the st ature that had authorized federal conrrol over food during and after the war.
Then, within two years, Warren I larding, rhc new Republican president, appoinred four new justices -including ex-President William I loward 'Eifr as ChiefJ ustice -who were more conservative and property conscious tha11 their predecessors. The stage was set for a period of conservative judicial activism.
The new 'J (di: Court moved quick! y to ensure social stabi 11 ty, 1 mpose j ud icial limitations on both state and fc:deral governnwms, and protect bus1-llc·ss, propnty, and the expandmg national market. 111 less rhan a decade 1 t invalidated legislation -in most cases measures passed liy the stares --in approximately 140 decisions, a rate far higher than that of any previOl!s Court. Its efforts were unwirringly enhanced by a seemingly tnlm1cal
Jllrisdictional statute enacted in 1 92 ':i-The so-called J u,li.;es· Bi 11 made the Colin's appd late jurisdiction almost wholly d iscretio;1ary·, thereby enabl 1ng It to decide freely not just how, but when and where, it would assnt its ,lllthority. After 1925 the Court's role in American governmem continued to expand, and its efforts became more purposeful, as shifting coalitions of Jll st ices lc·arned to use the Court's new jurisd1nional discretion to set their <iwn agendas.
Three of" the 'Edi: Court's early decisions 1-cvc·alnl its dncrminarion ro trnposc limits on government. Pe11111rfr,111ic1 Co,1! Co, 1·. 1\L1holl ( I <)22) lirnlttd horh state and f<.·deral pown over private property liy holdmg th,l! reglllatory actions that wem "too far" consrirutnl "takings" that, absent compensation, wne invalid under the Fifth am! Fourteenth Amend1nenrs.·'
type o statute t 1t' ,ourt s conservative JUst1ces cons 1, ere, espeua y obnoxious. Aclk111r proclaimed freedom of contract "the ,1.;eneral rule" and government regulation an "exception" confined to a frw narrow categories of specially "public" matters."' As much as the two cases demonstrated the
Court's determination to limit government regulation, however, they also suggested the difficulty the justices faced in their task. In each, the Court acknowledged that the limiting categories it used were incapable of precise delineation, a confession that highlighted the extent to which the lines it drew were the product, not simply of the Constitution, bur of the dominant attitudes of the era ,md the specific values of the justices themselves. Dc1,~mhc1rl (1918) that the commerce power did not allow Congress to ban the products of child labor from interstate commerce. Though seemingly inconsistent with prior dc_:cisions, Hcm1//ler voided the child labor statute on the ground that it was not a true effort to regulate interstate commerce, but rather a disguised attempt to intrude_: into a "local" activity-the production of goods-that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states. Amid a popular outcry against the decision, Congress respondnl with the Child Labor 'fax Act, relying on the i"cckral taxing power to impose special charges on employers who used child labor. Drexel /!11mit11re declared the_: second federal child labor act another subterfuge, one intended not to raise revc_:nue but to regulate , 1 local matter. Following f lc1111111er, it held the act invalid as a violation of the '!<:nth Amendment. It was "the hip;h duty of this court" to protect "local self-government" from "national power" and to preserve the federal system that, the justices declared, was "the ark of our covenant." If it failed to block the Child Labor 'fax Law, Drexel F11rnil11re warned, Congress could use its taxing power "to rake_: over to its control any one of rhe great number of subjects of public interest" that the Constitution reserved to the states. 1 Like earlier Courts, however, the 'fafr Court shaded its fe:-deral1sm decisions to fir its social values. It ignored I-ic1111111er when Congress passed ,1 statute prohibiting the movement of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, avoided Drexel /!11rni//1re when Congrc_:ss used its taxing power to control narcotics, and construed the commerce power with exceptional breadth when business invoked the federal antitrust laws ro break a small union's boycott of local employers. The Court stretched national power in the first case to protect private propc_:rry, in the second to allow government ro control what rhe justices viewed as a moral and social evil, and in the third ro check a potentially powerful weapon of organized labor.
The_: particular social values that the 'fafr Court protc_:cted quickly generated political controversy. Provoking strong opposition from Progressives and organized labor, its decisions sparked a variety of proposals for "curbing" tht Court by restricting its juri~diction or requiring a supermajority vote of six or seven justices to i 11validate legislation. I 11 r 924 Republican Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin helped organize a new Progressive Party and ran for president on a platform that indicted tht Court as an antiprogrcssivc· and pro-busi ncss partisan. I fr· proposed a constitutional amendn1enr that would authorize Congress to override a11y decision invalidating one of its statutes. Rising to the Court's defense, most Republicans and Democrats castigated the proposal as a radical and destructive assault on the foundations of A1llcrica11 federal ism. I 11 the clcctio11 La Follette did wcl I for a third-party rn11diclatc, hut he was overwhclmnl in a Republican landsliclc. While the election revealed widespread hostility to the 'Lift Court, it also suggested that the great majority of Americans supported the Court's institutional role, even if many of them disliked some of its 111dividual decisions.
Rtspo11ding to LaFollette and othn critics, Charles Warren, the nation's preeminent historian of the Supreme Court, seemed to speak for most Americans --even many Progressives -when he praised the Court for playing an essential institutional role in the f<.·dcral system. The "cxistl·nce of the American form of government -a federal republic with limited national powers -imp! ics and requires for its presc-rvation the existence ofa Suprtme Court," he declared. "The rctcntio11 of such a republic is inseparably hound up with the retention ofa Court having authority to enforce the limitation of national powers." Warren articulated a liclicf that had licen spreading since the mid-nineteenth cemury and that had become sacred writ arnong conservatives by the early twcnr1nh: the Supreme Court was the anchor oi" American uovcrnmc11t the 11aramount bulwark 11rou·crinu the American York ( 1925) the Court a1111ounc-cd that the right offre<: speech recognized by the First Amendment was part of the "liberty" prot<:cted by the Fourrc-cnth Amendnwnt and, consequently, was bi11ding on the states as well as the federal govcrnmenr. Although the Court's decisions in these areas were fr,w, they created a rich seedbed for the future.
C:onversdy, considering the rights of African Americans, the Taft Court left post-Reconstruction federalism <:ssentially unchanged. Refusing to question racial se,~re,~ation and disenfranchisement, it protected African American rights only in the most outrageous and exceptional cases. In 01w, where it granted habeas corpus rclid-to an African American sentenced to death in a Southern state court, it could not ignore the fact that the cll'fcndant had been convicted on unsubstamiated charges by an all-white Jury that had b<:en surroumll'd and intimidated by an angry white mob. In another, where it invalidated an "all-white" Texas primary clect1on system, it could not deny th<: explicitly racial nature of the legal discrimination or i rs negation of the fundamental constitutional right of all citizens to vote. In each case, however, the Court stressed the narrowness of its decision. Federal habeas corpus was rarely available, it declared, and criminal matters Wl'IT ordinarily local issues for the stares alon<: to resolve. Similarly, the all-white primary was unconstitutional solely because its racially discriminatory natutT was explicitly written into state law. Indeed, a decade later the Court unanimously approved a slightly more indirect version of the all-white state primary, one that was equally dfrcrive in maintaining black disenfranchisement but more cleverly designed as a matter of reig11ing constitutional law.
For their part, the states in the 1920s continued ro set policy not only in matters concerning race but also in most other areas that aflc·cted daily l1k, and they continued as well to provide most of the government services that Americans received. During the r 920s the states accounted for al most threequarrers of all public spending and two-thirds of the taxes col lcnnl. While a ftw sought to sustain the tradition of pre-war reform, most conformed to the conservative national mood that underwrote the Republicans· New Era. Largdy abandon mg efforts to regulate business and enact progressive social legislation, they sought to trim government regulation and concTntrated much of their spendmg on highway construction to meet the exploding demands created by the automobile. lndicative of the political mood, the States raised most of their highway money through regressive gasol 1ne taxes, which by r929 accounted for 25 percent of their total rax receipts. Indeed, while thirteen states had enacted mildly progressive income tax laws in the decade after 191 r, during the New Era only one state, New l lampshire, adopted such a tax. As a general matter, the govc-rnments of both states and nation seemed in accord on the basic issues of social and econ om 1c pol icy. Both seemed content, for the most part, to keep a low profile and give business its head. The year 1929 witnessed the onset of the decade-long and world-wide ( ;rear Depression. Causing massive disruptions and hardships, the Depression challenged the capacities of democratic governments throughout the world. The resulting turmoil paved the way for Adolph I litlcr to seize power in Gern1any, energized the forces of international Communism, aml u I timately helpc·d bring on a second ;ind far more destructive world war. In the lJnitcd Srates it ga~e birth to the New Deal and, togcthc-r with the-war and Cold War that followed, transformed Amc-rican kdcralism.
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The ravages of unemployment, bankruptcies, foreclosures, hank failut-cs, 10st savings, and crushed hopes savaged all classes and regions. Those 1dem1-hed with the roseate New Era of the r 920s -primarily business, the Republican Parry, and the federal judiciary -quickly became objects of angc-r and di st rust. Governments at all levels tried to respond to the emergency. State and local agencies, however, could provide neither the relief nor the structural reforms that seemed necessary. By 19 :-1 T their resources were exhausted, and the national and international scope of the ever-deepening crisis was undeniable. The frderal government under Republican President Herbert 1-foover became increasingly active, but it furnished far too little in the way of either money or leadership. The experience taught Americans two fundam(:'ntal kssons: that a massive governmental respons(:' was necessary and that only national action could possibly be adequate.
From 1 '.>°iO to T 93(i four successive elections repudiated the Republicans, and after 1932 the Democrats firmly controlled both the legislative and executive branches of the frderal government. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Nt:w Deal initiated a wide range of efforts to provide emergency relief, restructure and stimulate the economy, and reform the nation's financial institutions. Although the administration worked closely with state and local governments, political power shifted decisively to the federal level. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), for example, the New Deal's major initial efforts to reorganize and revive the economy, imposed sweeping fed(:'ral controls and reached extensively into matters of industrial and agricultural production that hitherto had seemed both local and private.
While the conservative orientation of the frderal judiciary clouded the future, it S(:'emed possible that the New Deal might proceed without e1Kountering fatal constitutional obstacles. The Taft Court had been split between six conservatives and three progressives, but that lineup had changed in 191,0 when "fafr and one of his conservative colleagues died. Charles Evans Hughes, a relatively progressive Republican, became Chief Justice, and the moderate Republican, Owen J Roberts, filled the second opening. In the early 19_:;,os the two new justices voted with the three progressiv(:'s in a number of critical cases, and they seemed to have tipped the judicial balance. The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to safoguard freedom of speech and provide some protection for African Americans in Southern state courts, and it gave broad constructions to both the commerce power and the category of business "affrcted with a public interest."
Further, in two sharply divided 5-4 decisions -with both Hughes and Roberts joining the Court's three progressives -it recognized the need for both state and federal governments to have emergency powers to combat the depression.
If the Hughes Court was different from the "faft Court, however, it nonetheless remained committed to enforcing limits on economic regulation by both the states and the federal government. In early I ()~-\5 it invalidated a part of the NIH.A and then began a series of rulings -with Roberts and sometimes I Iughes joining the four conservatives -that checked state and federal re:gulatory power and, in the process, declared both the AAA and the remainder of the NIRA u11co11stitutionaL Invoking the Tenth Amendment to invalidate another New Deal measure, Roberts and the four conservatives emphasized that "every addition to the national legislative power to some extent detracts frorn or invades the power of the states ... c, While the anti-New Deal majority invoked the idea of fr·deralism, the dis,emers often did the same. Illustrating the intrinsically doublc-edi,ed nature of the concept, Justice Brandeis, the C:outt's leading progressive, deployed 1t to urn.lcrmrne the conservative majority. Excessive centralization could flow not only from Congress, he warned in 1 ')-\2, but from the fedc:ral judiciary as well. In voiding the reasonable social and econrnnic regulations that the states attempted, Brandeis declared, the Court was llot exercising "the function of judicial review, but the function of a supcrlegislature." Jts anti-progressive decisions unwisely restricted the states and improperly centralized American government. Moreover, he charged, the Court's decisions negated a signal virtue of American frderalism. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory," Brandeis explained, "and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 1-csr of the country." Confronted by "an emergency more serious than war," Americans had the right to experimem with a variety of possible remedies, and the· nat1on's fr·dl'.ral system was de·signnl to allow such diverse and crl'ative dforrs. 7 Turning the rabies on the conservative majority, Brandeis used his progressive theory of' "experimentalist" federalism ro indict the Court itself as a centralizing force that was obstructing the· fedu·,d system's proper operation.
Not surprisingly, the double-edged nature of American fedl'ralism provided the· Court's anti-progressive majority with a ready response. The st ates could "indul"e in experimental lei..;islat1011 .. Justin· Gcor"c Sutherland replied for the 7onservat1ve 1rn1Jori ty'. bur thq: c;nild nor "rra:~sccnd the limitations imposl'.d upon them by the frderal Constitution." National l11n-Its existed and controlled, and the Court itself was the institution that identified and applied those limits. ''The pri11ciple is embedded in our constitutional system," he declared, "that there arc certain essentials of liberty with Which the state is not emitled to dispense in the i merest of expcri rnenrs .... , Thus, the Supreme Court ~ the ostensible bulwark of fr·deralism ~ once
J., di:-.s(·11ti11p,, joined hy Stone, J.). Jusriu· C,1nlozo, the third pro,t~rc.\.\!\T, did nm
qo again suved not as the defender of state autonomy but as an agent of national power.
The Court's anti-New Deal decisions set up one of the most famous episodes in its history, the "Constitutional Revolution of r<:)7,7." The standard tale is familiar and the storyline dramatic. Overwhelmingly reelected with crushing Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress, Roosevelt stunned the: nation with his proposal to "pack" the Supreme Court by adding one new justice, up to a total of six, for every member of the Court over the age of seventy. Then, while Congress and the nation debated the plan, the: Court suddenly seemed to change its position. In a series of 5-4 decisions -I lughes and Roberts joining the three progressives -it discarded the doctrine of liberty of contract and drastically broadened federal pown. Over the next few years the Court's four conservatives resigned, and the president replaced them with loyal New Dealers who extended the changes the Court had begun in the spring of r97,7.
The traditional story over-inflates the role of the Court-packing plan and oversimplifies the processes of constitutional change. The label "revolution," moreover, obscures complexities. There was continuity as well as change in the Court's decisions, and many of the innovations that occurred had roots in earlier periods and witnessed their full flowering only in later ones. In spite of the qualifications necessary, however, the traditional story highlights a fundamental fact: the New Deal years brought fundamental and far-reaching changes to the frderal system. First, the New Deal altered the way the system functioned. Centralizing many arl'as of American life, a dozl'n path-brl'aking measures assl'rted nl'w or expancll'd federal authority over the nation's economy and financial system. The National Labor Relations Act, for l'xample, which the Court upheld under a broadened commerce power, extended federal regulatory authority co the employment relationship and guarameed labor the right to organize and bargain collcccivcly. The result was the centralization of government labor policy, the prl'emption of many state laws considered hostile co workl'fs, and che transformation of organized labor inco a nl'wly pO\vl'rful and nationalizing force in American politics. Similarly, the Social Security Act, which the Court upheld under a broad construction of the spending and taxing powers, established t!w institutional foundations for ,1 limited national welfarl' statl'. The act placl:'d special taxes on workt·rs and l'mployl·rs, crl:'atl'd a variety of federal social support programs, and used condicional grants to enlist scare participation and impose federal standards on their operation.
In addition, the New Deal moved the federal governnll'llt into a widl'ning range of previously local areas. It establishl'd agencil's to insure individual home mortgages and private bank accounts, for example, and it funded a series of massive projects to construct local public facilities and provide employmt·nt for millions. Using its power to tax and spend, it provickd grants to states for a variety of new programs and raised the amounts involved into the billions of dollars. The grants extended federal involvemc·nt into such previously local areas as employment counseling, health care, public housing, conservation, slum clearance, social welfare, and child care programs.
Numbers told much of the story. In 191 :\ state and local governments had spent more than twice as much as rhe federal government, bur by 1942 their spend mg amounted ro barely a quarter of the national total. Federal expenditures skyrocketed from less than ',CJ percent to almost 80 percent of total government spending in the Un ired States. Similarly, in , 929 frderal grants to stare and local agencies had stood at less than $1ou million, but after 19 "\'5 they avera,ged more than a billion dollars a year.
Furrhc·r, rhe New Deal altered the functioning relationship between kdlTa] and state governments. As growing fcxleral financing made national direction seem, increasingly appr:)priarc.', the fc·deral gove1'.nrnent began to expand its administrative capacities and enforce righter and more derailed controls over its grants. Some of the condnirn1s it imposed began to regulate not just spc'.nding hut also the operations of the state ,rnci local go~-ernnwnt agencies that administered rhe grant programs. Further, rhc rapid l'Xpansion of federal-state grant programs began to alter the politics of 1 ntergovernmc11tal relations. It nourished larger bureaucracies at all lcvl'!s of government; interrnixed rhe operations and imerests of the fc:deral, st ate, and local officials who administered thu11; and began to create new 111 terest groups made up of program bc·ncficiaries and their vaned political supporters. Still embryonic 111 the late 19yis, those msritutional changes Would accelerate in rlw coming decades and i11creasmgly reshape the de facto operat1011s of American frderalism.
The New Deal, moreover, tipped rhe balance of rlw fc:deral system even n,ore by expanding the institutional authority of the national executive. Roosevelt broadened the power of the presidency by providing a charisn,atic image of national leadership, assuming a major role in initiating and securing passage of legislation, and by boldly exercising his authority to issue executive orders. I k also strengthened the instirutional resources of the presidency. Although C:on,gress 1'.efused ro adopt his swt-cpi11,g plan to reorganize the cxecmive branch, in 19 )9 it established the nxecutive Oflice of the President, providing an expanded sraffand other 1-csources that allowed the pres idem to exert greater control over the executive branch and to Project his policy decisions more cffrctively.
The second major chan,ge that the New Deal brought was ro inspire substantial changes in co11stirutional law that allowed governments at all levels to assert expanded regulatory powers. Most obvious, the post-19) 7 Court stretched federal legislative power far beyond its prior limits. In {foi1ecl Stales 1'. Darby ( 1 94 r) it overruled Hc1111111er u. Dc1,~enhart and renounced the idea that the Tenth Amendment created a substantive barrier against national power. The Tenth Amendment, it declared, could never block an action chat was otherwise within the constitutional powers of the national government. Further, the Court broadened the commerce power to allow far-reaching regulation of economic activities. ln the late nineteenth century it had held that the "production" of goods was not "commerce" but a local activity immune from Congressional reach, and in the early decades of the twentieth century it had maintained that distinction while expanding the types of local activities that were sufficiently "close" to interstate commerce to come within Congressional power. After 1957 it found an ever wider range of activities falling within that pow<.'.r, and in 1942 it discarded both the close relationship test and the distinction betw<.'.en "production" and "comm<.'.rce.'' In \Vickc1rd 11. f,jf/mm ( 1 942) the Court held that Congress could r<.'.gulate any activity that -as part oft he agg1Tgate ofal I such activitywas likdy to hav<.'. some practical <.'.€feet on interstate commerce. llmkr that construction the commerce power seemed capable of r<.'.aching almost anything. Finally, going beyond J\las.1uchme/t1 z•. Mellon, the Court construed the Taxing, Spending, and General Welfare Clauses with exceptional breadth. It held that they constituted independ<.'.nt grants of power, authorized taxing and spending for the broadest purposes of national welfare, and allowed the kderal government to make grants to the states contingent on the states' acceptance of federal conditions and limitations. Such restrictions, the Court ruled, neither coerced the states nor invaded any of their reserved rights.
Similarly, as the international situation grew ominous in the late 1 <J.-1os and Roosevelt moved toward a more activist foreign policy, th<: Court enhanced tl1<.' . powers of the president over the nation's foreign affairs. Ir ruled that the nation's "powers of external sovereignty"'J lay in tlw execmive branch, existed independent oft he Constitution, and operated free of restriction from any resc:rved rights of the states. In a striking decision in 1 'J.-17 it held that the president had authority to make "executive agreements" without Senat<.'. approval and that such agreements trumped otherwise valid state laws. Thus, as foreign policy emerged as a newly dorninant concern in the late 1950s, the expansion of presidential powu· accelerated even motT rapidly, bringing larger areas of American ]if<: under federal authority and, in an increasingly vital area of national concern, edging the states toward the periphery.
The Co11rts. fieclera/1.1111 . and the Federtt! Comtit11tio11. 1920 -2000 While constitutional changes during the New Deal years substantially expanded federal power, they also broaclen(_'d stat(' regulatory authority. Th(_' Courr narrow(_'d its us(' of both federal pr(_'emption a11d rhe n('gat1v(' C:om-!11('fce Claus(_' to allow stares an expand(_'d role in regulati11g ('Conomic act1v-iti('s, made stat(' rath('r then f(_'dnal common law controlling in the national courrs on issues of stat('-creatcd rights, and in a vari('ty of cases instruct('d the lower tl'.deral courts to dcf<-·r to th(' proc(_'(_'dings of state courts and administrative ag(_'nci('s. Further, when it abolished the doctrines of~ substantive du(' procTss and liberty ofcontracr, the C:ourr freed stare· as well as federal legislative power. In \\1/est Cot1sl [ [ote! Co. z·. f>drri.,h ( 1 ') 2,7) it overruled Aclkim 1. Chifdrm'.r [lo1jlitt1! and upheld the authority ofsrates to enact minimum wage statutes for womt·n, subsra11tially enlarging their gcnnal police powers. The stat('S W('re not shy about using th('ir new powns, moreover, extending th('ir regulatory, service, ancl welfare activities substamially. The third major change that the New D(_'al brought was the transformation of th(' rederal judiuary. Roos('vclt restaffed th(' lower courts with appointees sympath('tic to his policies, and b('tW('l'n 1 <J.'>7 and 1 ').J"\ he reoril·11ted tlw Suprcm(_' Court by filling scv('n of its scats with administration loyalists. The n(_'w judg('s, in turn, began to r('shapc f(_'deral law 111 line with the goals and values of the New Deal. Some rnaintainnl that they Were merely casting off crabbed doctrinal accrnions from the larc n111t·-teenth C('lltury and !"('Storing the expansive constirntional principles that the Found('rs had originally intended. Others hega11 to articulate a new attitude toward constitutional law. Th(_'y advanced the idea thar rhe ( :onst itution was a flexible, practical, and even "living" i11strun1ent. The Founders had used broad and adaptive t('rms, they argued, so that Americans would be able to respond etfrctively to future problems as the changing d(_'mands of th(_'ir well-b(_'ing required.
Drawing on those ideas and th('ir New Deal sympathies, frd(_'ral judges bt\~an to infuse new meanings into the constirntional ideals of libnry .llld l'l]Uality. They began to give incr(_'ased protection to the kinds of"11nso11,d" liberties that they believed all individuals should enjoy in a democratil society while downgrading tht· economic 11 b('rties rhat accrued, as a practical 1 natter, pri rnarily to the benefit of large corporat 1011s and the ec01mm ical ly Powerful. Further, th('y sou,~l1t to move beyond mere ft>rmal lc,~,d equality and nourish ,l greater practical equality by showing, often though surely not invariably, a special solicitude to individuals and groups that were weak or disadvantaged -African Americans, workers, consumers, labor unions, political dissenters, victims of industrial injury, and unpopular ethnic and religious minorities.
Hal tingly and somewhat erratically, the post-19 _::17 Court floated a variety of constitutional theories to justify its shifting social orientation, including the idea that the Constitution required it to provide special protection for rights that were "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions" or that were so "fundamental" as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."''' Although the Court did not consistently apply any single theory, one of those it suggested would -decades later and in the wake of the Warren Court -become particularly influential. When normal democratic political processes were working and citizens had fair opportunities to influence their governments, five justices declared in U11ited Stc1tes z;. C{tro!ene Prod11cts Co. ( r 9 )8), the Court should defer to decisions of the political branches. Conversely, when normal democratic processes were blocked or when they led to systemic abuses against helpless minorities, the Court should intervene to runedy the situation. Translating theory into doctrine, Carolene Prod11cts suggested that judicial review should operate on two tracks. When the Court reviewed ordinary economic regulations that resulted from normal political competition and compromise, it would apply a "rational basis" test, upholding government action if the action bore a reasonable relation to some legitimate government end. When, however, it reviewed cases involving the denial of fundamental non-economic rights or discriminatio11 against "discrete and insular mi11oricies" -situations in which ordinary democratic processes had failed to work properly -the Court would apply a "stricter scrutiny," an inquiry that would validate government actions only on a showing chat the actions were narrowly tailored and essential to achieve a compelling governmental goal.'' Regardless of its varied justifications and sometimes contradictory rulings, the post-19."7 Court was proposing itself as the protector of abused individuals and minorities, and, in so doing, it was also turning away from its earlier role as umpire of the federal system. On the ground chat fair democratic politics should ordinarily prevail and that the legislative branch represented the states as well as the people, it accepted the principle that Congress was ordinarily the proper institution to determine whether and to what extent federal power should be exercised. Similarly, on the ground that the president had vast authority and discretion in the conduct of foreign
relations, it increasingly deferred to executive decisions that implicated foreign policy concerns. The altered role the Court sketched would help define the triple tracks of governmental centralization that marked the years after r 93 7. In economic matters Congress would exercise sweeping national kgislarive authority; in foreign pol icy matters the president would exercise an ever-growing and often uncl1ecked executive discretion; and in certain areas involving non-economic social and political rights the Court would come to assert an expanding national judicial authority.
\\½11: Cole/ \¥ic1r. ,me/ C11,;/ !?1ph1.1: '/he I hgh YMn o/1he Neu· Dct1! Order
World War II and the dominating events that followed -the· birth of the nuclear age, the 011set of the Cold War, and the crncrge11ce of the United States as the undisputed leader of"the f1-ce world" -reinforced rhe nationalizing trend that the Depression, the New Deal, and the nation's longaccelerating econom 1c and cultural centralization had forged. The war led to massive expansions in the federal bureaucracy, swecpi ng national controls over the domestic economy, and the induction of more than 1 (i mill ion rne11 and women into the armed forces. The Cold War that followed sustained the national mobilization, generated a pervasive anri-C:ornmunisrn that further homogenized and centralized politirnl debate, and provided a national security justification for growing federal inrrus1ons imo areas pITv1ously left to the states. Turning the nation from its traditio11al and relatively aloof foreign policy, the war and Cold War transformed the United Scates inro a global military and economic superpower at least porenrially interested 1 11 even the smallest and most distant regions of the world. The 1 1ower and activities of the federal government grew apace, and the role of the presidency, in parncular, continued to swell. The National Security An of 1947 established both the National Sernrity Council a11d the C:enrral lnrelligence Agency as powerful a11d wel !-funded agencies of the executive hra11ch, and the:-White House staff, which numbered 61 people at the e11d of World War II, jumped to ',')') by I ')'57 and then to 48<; only six year later. All extended the presidenr's ability to comrol and enforce 11ario11al policy a11d ro shape the contours of the 11atio11's donwst,c political debates. The escalating foreign policy challenges, moreover, induced the C:ourr to adopt a highly deferential attitude toward both Congress and the presidc11t, temporarily checking its proclaimed 11ew comrnitmellt to protect civil liberties. During the war the C:ourr refused to challenp;e the army's decision ro place more than a hu11dred thousa11d Jap,.:1ese-Americans in co11ce11rrat1011 camps, and into the 1950s it failed to protect the civil liberties of many of those who ran afoul of the second Red Scare that erupted in the early years of the Cold War.
Ahhough postwar politics grew more conservative, the major achievements of the New Deal remained largely in place. Harsh memories of the Great Depression, the unprecedented efforts of the Roosevelt administration to alleviate the nation's ills, and the stunning and sustained economic boom that followed wartime mobilization combined to inspire a broad new consensus. Americans had come to believe that many of the pressing difficulties they faced were "social" in nature, not "individual,'' and that government could and should take a more active role in resolving them. Indeed, their acceptance of the idea that a newly muscular federal government was necessary to protect national security in the Cold War strengthened their belief that the same national government cou Id also act as an effective instrument of rational, democratic problem solving at home. Increasingly, they looked to government at all levels for an expanding variety of services. Most immediately, they had rnnw to Lx:lieve that anything affecting the American economy was properly a national issue for which the federal government should rake responsibility. Sustaining economic growth and ensuring full employment became domestic goals of the highest priority, and Americans assumed that one of the primary duties of the federal government was to underwrite the nation's continuing economic welfare. Accordingly, government at all levels grew, and the federal government expanded most rapidly. With its unparalleled capacity for raising funds through tl1e national income tax, and the distinct advantages its members realized from dispensing public money, Congress proved increasingly ready to finance new programs and expand old ones. Funds allocated to regular domestic grant programs, for example, doubled in only the first two years after the war.
Although the Republicans controlled <if one or both Houses of Congress as well as the presidency for much of the period from r 94 6 to r 960, they gradually acceded to most New Deal reforms and even joined in expanding the activities of the federal government. Congress passed new public housing, urban redevelopment, and minimum wage legislation, and it expanded federal spending programs to enlarge Social Security, guarantee opportunities for returning veterans, and provide funding for education, conservation, hospital construction, scientific research, and rural electrification. During the presidency of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower from 19'd to 1961, federal aid to states on a per capita basis more than doubled. The system of "dual federalism" had passed away, replaced by one of "cooperative federalism" in which governments at all levels participated in a widening variety of joim programs and dealt with national problems by blending federal funding and direction with state· and local administration. lllustrating both the spread of cooperative fi:deralism and the ways in which Cold War national defense concerns fostered the expansion of the national government, Republicans and Democrats joined forces in r 956 to pass the Interstate I I ighway Act. The measure provided massive federal funding for the construction ofa 40,000-rnile interstate highway system that promised to benC:fit a wide range of groups and interests across the nation. The states supported it enthusiastically, and Congress easily justified it as necessary for national defense. lndeed, the extent to which the federal system, and normative theories about it, had evolved became apparenr rather quickly. Between H)47 and 1959 Republicans and other supporters of states'-rights ideas initiated four major efforts ro study the fc:dcral system and find ways to check and t'l've,rse the trend toward centralization. None had a noticeable impact. During his presidency, Eisenhower sponsored two such efforts. In r 95 7, for e·xamplc, he urged the creation ofa special govcrnmcm task force designed "to designate functions which the, States arc ready and willing to assume and finance that arc now performed or financed wholly or i11 part by the Federal Covt'rnme'nt."
12 'fo accomplish that end, he cooperated with the National Governors Conference 111 establishing a.Joint Federal-State· Action Committee composed of officials from the highest ranks of state and kderal government. After an elaborate and well-financed study, the com mi ttt'e was ablt' to identify only two programs -vocational t'ducation and municipal Waste treatmt'nt -that should be transfc:rrnl from fi:dt"ral to state conrrol. lrlgethcr, the two programs accounted for a barely notict"able 2 percent of total frderal grants to stat<:' and local governments. While a variety of political and economic factors conspired to trivialize the committet''s conclusions, its much-heralded effort revealed 011e overpowering fan. By the 1 ':ls;os a complex system of nationally directed and ti.1nded cooperative frdl:ralism had been firmly established and was becomin,t; widely accepted in both theory and practice.
While some conservatives still hoped to restore a rr101T decentralized system, liberals worked to shape the operations of the new order to their purposes. If national power had been drastically expanded and federalism transformed into a '·cooperative" system, they reasoned, then the Supreme Courr requirt'd a new institutional role adapted ro those new conditions. Tht' horrifying brutalities of Nazi and Soviet rotal1tarian1sm inspired an intensified commitment to the idea of the rule of law, and the tumultuous Cold War campaigns against Communism heightened tllt'ir belief that the nation needed a strong judiciary ro protect individual liht"rtics. Further, the growing conservatism of the states in economic matters, their enthusiasm for fighting Communism by restricting civil liberties, and -most crucially ~ the adamant determination of those in the South to preserve racial segregation combined to cast a new and unflattering light on the idea that the states were democratic laboratorie~; that should be free to conduct social experiments. Indeed, in the postwar years the very term "social experiment" raised images not of beneficent progressive reforms but of Nazi death chambers and Stalinist labor camps. Increasingly, Democrats and liberals turned to the reoriented post-New Deal foderal judiciary as the government institution most likely to enfi:irce national rules that would serve their new values, interests, and aspirations.
One of the most thoughtful, and eventually influential, fi_lrmulations of those liberal attitudes came from Herbert Wechsler, a prominent legal scholar and old New Dealer. The normative constitutional problem that postwar liberals faced, Wechsler explained, was to find a principled way to "defend a judicial veto" when used to protect "personal freedom," but to "condemn it" when used to block government actions '·necessary for the decent humanization of American capitalism."'' In !<)54 Wechsler suggested an elegant solution. The Constitution itself guaranteed statt: sovereignty by providing the states "a role of great importance in the composition and selection of the central government." Those "political safeguards of federalism" included equal state representation in the Senate, control over many aspects of voting and districting for the House, and a key role in electing the president through the system of electoral votes. Thus, the very structure of the Constitution meant that Congress and the president would "be responsive to local values that have large support within the states." Consequently, there was 110 need for tht: Court to protect the states or to serve as the umpire of federalism. Instead, the constitutional structure suggested that the Court should focus its efforts elsewhere. First, because the federal government had no part in composing the state governments, it was the federal government, not the states, that needed the Court's protection. Thus, the Court should ensure "the maintenance of national supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states." Second, because the Constitution's majoritarian "political processes" would not remedy popular and democratic abuses against disfavored minorities, the Court should enforce "those constitutional restraints on Congress or the states that are designed to safeguard individuals."' 1 Thus, post-New Deal liberalism began to develop the id<::a that Caro/me Prod11cts had voiced:
'' Nor111a11 Sil her and Ccolfrcy Milkr, "'\i,ward 'Nl"utral P1·i11ripks' i11 thl' Law: Sclr·ctiom the Constitution underwrote the principle that the Court should protect abused individuals and helpless minorities, not the already powerful states or the well-entrenched federal system.
In the postwar years the most systematically disadvantaged minority in the United Scates was African Americans, and a variety of factors pushed the Court to take action on their behalf Some were internal: a frw useful precedents, the spread of post-New Deal liberal values, the justification provided by the Cr1mlene Prod!lllJ idea, and key changes in the Court's personnel -especially the appo1 ntrnent in 1 95 ', of Earl Warren as Ch1ef.J ustice. Others were external. The African American community had bee11 leaving the South, developing a strong middle class, increasing in organization and militancy, and .~aining political influence in the North. Further, the atrocities of Nazi c;ermany had discred 1 ted racist ideas, and the C:old \'var rnade repudiation of racism necessary to counter Soviet efforts ro umlerm 111e American influence in the Third World. The Democratic Party, roo, had been transformed since the New Deal. Incrcaslllgly urban, northern, 1 iberaL and reliant on African American votes, it was ready to support meaningful efforts to end racial oppression. Finally, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was pressing a methodical legal campa(~n against racial segregation, and its dforts presented a series ofwcll-desigm·d constitutional challenges that allowed the Court to chip away at legalized racial segre.~ation. To.~ethcr, the changc"S highlighted the discordant nature of Southern raual practices, led increasing numbers of Americans to rejecr them, and helped install 111 tlw fl'deral courts Judges syrnpatlwtic ro the cause of racial equality.
The judicial turning point came in 1954 when rhe Court ruled in /lro11·11
1 ' · l3ollrd 11/ l!d11cc1tio11 (1954) that racial segregation in the public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause and then, over the next li:w years, cxtended its ruling to a variety of other public institutions and facilities. Exemplifying and dramatizing the idea of the rc:deral judiuary as the protector of both fundamental non-economic rights and "discrete and insular minorities," the decisions asserted national authority over rhe stares in a crucial area of social policy, one that had been labeled "local" si nee the end of Reconstruction. a galvanizing civil rights movement, but they also provoked bitter and sometimes violent opposition. By themselves they were unable to end racial segregation in the South. That bad to await events of tbe following decade.
/3ro11?1 and the civil rights struggle helped fire the tumultuous era known as ''the sixties," a politico-cultural phenomenon that began sometime after r 95 7, became self-conscious in thl'. rnrly r 960s, peaked between r 965 and 1972, and expired rapidly after 1974. Underlying social developments -a sustained economic boom, rapid expansion and luxurious federal support of higher education, the emergence of experimental "youth cultures" and radical "liberation" movements, and the popularization of social theories that challengcd traditional idcas across tl1l'. board -combined to spur major changes in American attitudes and values. Melding with escalating and disruptive protests against an ev<:r widening and seemingly futile war in Vietnam, the changes generatcd a volatile era of turmoil and transformation, of vaulting hopes and intensifying hatcs.
With respect to the: frderal system, the: sixti<:s initially accelerated the trend toward centralization. Democratic President .John F. Kennedy inspired a new cnthusiasm for liberal activism after his election in I 960, and his successor Lyndon H. Johnson strove to build a "Great Society," one in which the frderal government would achieve the social and economic goals of the New Deal and ensure that all Americans shared in their benefits. The Supreme Court became increasingly active in imposing liberal national standards on the states, and aftcr an overwhelming Democratic victory in 1 sl>4, Congress responded with a series of major domestic reforms. Furthcr, between 1 9(i 1 to 1971 the: nation ratified four constitutional amendments, three of which protected the right of Americans to vote, limiting state authority and giving Congrl'.ss power to enforce their mandates.
Of most cnduring importance, the federal government as a whole finally committed itself to the cause of black civil rights. Kennedy and Johnson increasingly embraced the issue, and between 1964 and 1968 Congrc:ss passed three monumental civil rights acts. Two broadly prohibited racial and other types of discrimination in housing, education, employment, and "public accommodations." The third negatl'.d a wide range oflegal and practicil obstacles that Southern states deploycd to dcny African Americans the franchise. Equally important, the statutes created effective remedies for violations and made the federal govcrnment an activl'. and continuous agent of enforccmem. Illustrating the relatively consistent purpose that animated thc entire fi.:deral govcrnment in the late 1960s, the executive branch immediately initiated or expanded a variety of programs to enforce thc new civil rights statutes, wh ilc the Supreme Court quickly upheld their constitutionality. Ir approved the sharply challenged public accommodations provision
The Col!rts. Pederalis111. c1ricl the Peciert1! Comiit11tio11. 1920--2000 I 5 1 by applying the sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause advanced in Wickard v. Piib11m, and it validated federal control over voting rights on the ground that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Anwmlment gave Congress the broadest possible power necessary to enforce the amendment's rights. By the end of the r96os legalized segregation was crumbling, a11d the constitutional pillar of post-Reconstruction frderalism that had survived tlw New Deal~ the principle that racial matters were local~ had been obliterated.
Congress expanded frderal authority in orlll'r areas as wdl. .Johnson's Great Society reached into the backwaters of American life, ide11tifyi11g the very existence of poverty and inequality as problems of national importance.
Like the theory of Cc1mle11e Pmd11cls and the concerted attack on racial discrimination, his War on Poverty sought to assist the nation's poorest groups and remedy fundamental strucrnral inequalities. Congress aurhorized ever more generous grants to state and local governments for a seemingly lin1-itlc:ss variety of "categorical" purposes, including welfare, housing, child care, mass transit, job training, education, urban renewal, medical insurance, and legal services for the poor. Similarly, the federal governmellt began a concerted effort to deal with issues of environmental pollution and the conservation of natural resources. Increasingly, moreover, the new programs Were intended not merely to help state and local governments deal with their ])roblems but to implement national policies designed to achieve national objectives.
A report of the federal Advisory Commission on lntcrgovernrnenral Relations published in 1 967 charred the steady and accderat1ng expansion of federal funding programs. Before 19Yl the national governnwm offrrnl funding to state and local governments in only ten areas of activity. The New Deal brought federal funding ro seventeen more areas, and the early Postwar years added another twenty-nine to the list. The period from 1961 to r9(i6, however, witnessed the most explosive growth. New programs extended federal fi.111ding to another thirty-nine areas ofswte and local ,~ov-ernment activity --an increase of almost 70 percent in only six years. Thus, by r9Ci7 the fi::deral government was funding state and local government activities in 95 areas and doing so through 2,79 separate categorical grant j)rograms. In a decade, total ft.:deral aid ro state and local governments tripled, rismg from $4.9 billion in 1958 to ~15.2 billion in 1967.
The political momentum carried into the next decade. Even under Republican President Richard M. Nixon, who talked abour a "new i"ederalisn1" that would return power to the states, national activism continued. Indeed, in the first two years of his administration federal funding to stare ,ind local govc 0 rnments jumped by more than a rhml, reaching $25 billion 111 1 970. Through a variery of changes within tlw executive branch, Nixon enhanced presidemial power to manage both the fr.dcral bureaucracy and the distribution of funds to the states. He sought not so much to limit federal power and government activism as to make all government agencies more streamlined and efficient. Moreover, stressing the problem of "crime in the streets" and the need frir "law and order," he accelerated the use of the national government to fight crime, particularly "organized" crime and narcotics trafficking. New legislation expanded the scope of the federal criminal law, turned a multiplying number of state-law crimes into federal violations, and in the Racketeer I nf-luencecl and Corrupt Organizations Act ( r 970) gave the national government muscular new tools to investi 0 ,;ate and prosecute transgressors. Similarly, the decade brought major federal initiatives aimed at protecting the environment and expanding government welfare services. Although some social programs, particularly those involving Johnson's War on Poverty, were crimped or terminated, many others took their place. During the decade total federal spending on welfare programs more than doubled. By r979 Congress had established more than five hundred grant programs that accounted for a third of the federal budget and furnished state and local governments with approximately 1,0 percent of their total revenue. Nforeover, although lZepublicans criticized many aspects of the civil rights movement, especially school busing, affirmative action, and some aspects of anti-discrimination law, the party~ or at least its Northern wing~ accepted many of the changes the movement had brought.
As federal fu11di11g gushed forth, the national government's control over its programs continued to tighten. Although Nixon sought to minimize federal restrictions through uncond i tio11al "revenue sharing" and less restrictive "block grants," his efforts were only minimally successful. Federal agencies swelled in number and responsibilities, while the scope and rnmpkxity of their regulations multiplied geometrically. Expanding and reorganizing the federal bureaucracy, for example, Congress established the Departments of Housing and Urban Development ( 1 965), Transportation ( r 966), Energy ( 1 977 ), and Education ( 1 979), as well as the Environmental Protection Agency ( 1970), to help administer some of its new programs. The agencies spawned a growing body of regulations that ranged from detailed rules controlling individual categorical programs to broad across-the-board rules covering many or all grant programs. Increasingly, moreover, federal regulations sought to serve a variety of national policies ~ ending discrimination, protecting tlw environment, expanding opportunities fcir the disadvantaged ~ unrelated to specific grant programs themselves. During the 1 970s the total number of federal regulations more than doubled, and Congress and the federal bureaucracy were increasingly regulating not just the distribution of funds but the policies and operations of state and local governments themselves.
The continul'd 0~r owtl1 of kderal activism was driven in large part by three fundamental changes in the political system. One was the increasing centralization that marked al I areas of American public lifi:_• and transformed ever larger numbers of issues imo matters of national concern. The accelerating nationalization and internationalization or economic enterprise, the dramatic and unifying power of ever mon: pervasive mass media, the growing case and speed of travel, and the frequency with which Americans moved their homes from state to sratl' and region to region combined to homogenize Amnican I ife and cul rure, a11d the atti rnd i nal changes that resul red increasingly made most problems seem national 1n scope and resolvable only with national solutions. Moreover, the ever-tightening tyra11ny of money in the political process magnified the influence: of those private organizationsalmost always national in operation and concern -that werl' capable of providing the huge campaign donations that the political parties required. Those organizations -corporations, labor unions, industrial and profrssional associations, and swelling varieties of ideological advocacy groups -almost invariably sought, in return for their support, national policy decisions that Would provide thc,m with advantages national in scope.
Tl1c second change lay in the new a11d stronger sets of interlocking local, state, and national interests that resulted from the, massive federal spl'ndi11g programs of the prior decadl's. The programs were attractive to members of Congress who found them ideal ways to shape policy while assisting their favored interest groups, furnwling money to their districts, and improving rlteir chances of reelection. Further, the programs developed their own Powerful constituencies: grant recipiems and the interest groups who supported them; professionals who designed and adminisrnul the programs; and i1rnumcrablc ofliuals at all levels of government who for reasons of public policy, bureaucratic i11flucncc, and personal advancement found the programs highly desirable. As fr·deral spending grew, so did the power of those imcrlocking interests, and they continued to drive expanded frdcral ~pending in the 1970s even as the animating values of post-New Deal liberalism were withering.
The third change was rooted in the altered role of the presidency in an age of mass communications and cultural ce11tralization. Dominating national politics and the public agenda, presidents -and all serious candidates for the office -found it essential to propose national solutions for almost every problu11 that drew national attention. By the late rwcmicrh cenrury American presidents were expected to act 110t only as chief executives and commandcrs-in-chiefbut also as legislative leaders and all-purpose national problem solvers. The nation's seemingly limitless demands 011 the office magnified its irresistibly ccmripetal f,:irce.
While Congress, the executive, and concentrating social pressures were extending foderal power, the Supreme Court was doing the same. Beginning in the early 1 960s, the Warren Court launched a new and broader phase ofliberal activism. Shifted leftward by the retirement of two conservatives -including .Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court's leading advocate of "judicial restraint" and deference to tlw states -and galvanized by the reformist nationalism of Warren and Justice William_). Brennan, a new majority coalesced in almost perfect harmony with the decade's vibrant liberal politics. Between r 962 and 1 969 the Court expanded its efforts far beyond civil rights and announced a breathtaking series of decisions that imposed federal limitations on the states in a variety of areas. Perhaps of greatest institutional importance, the Court asserted national authority over the districting and apportionment of state and local legislative bodies. Rejecting earlier decisions, it ruled that the Equal Protection Clause required that electoral districts have closely comparable populations based on the egalitarian standard of "one person, one vote. "' 6 Similarly, the Court substantially expanded the reach of the First Amendment. Construing the amendment's religion clauses, it prohibited a variety of government-sponsored religious practices, ruling that states could not require officeholders to declare their belief in God, sponsor Bible reading as part of the public school curriculum, or compel schoolchildren to recite compulsory prayers. Construing the Free Speech Clause, it ruled that tlw states could punish advocacy only if a person's words were specifically calculated to incite imminent unlawful actions, and it held that the right of free speech created a qualified privilege against state defamation suits, a decision that not only limited state law but opened the way for particularly vigorous criticism of state and local officials. Perhaps most innovative, in Grisll'ofd 1: C()/meclimt ( 1965) it held that the First Amendment, in rnniunction with other amendments, created a constitutional right of privacy that barred states from prohibiting residents from using or conveying inform,1-tion about contraceptives.
Equally controversial, the Warren Court applied most of the rest of the Bill of Rights to the states. Again reversing prior doctrine, it held that the cemral provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were "incorporated" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteemh Amendment. Moreover, it repeatedly broadened the protections that the clauses offered. In what was probably its most controversial decision in the area, 1\lir,mclt1 11. 1\ri:umc1 (19(16) , it required law enforcement agents to inform artTstL·es about their constitutional rights and to respect their decision to exercise those rights. 'fo enforce its rulings, the Court expanded the availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, enabling the lower federal judiuary to review state court criminal convictions more frequently. The decisions created, in effect, an expanding federal code of criminal procedure that bound the states, restrained police behavior across the nation, and provoked bitter and widespread criticism.
As Congressional activism continued into the 1970s, so did the Court's. Although Ch iefJ ustice Warren resigned in 1 969 a11d Nixon appo1 nred four new justices, including the new chic.f justice, \Xlarren E. But),cr, the Court changed less than many expected. Indeed, i11 several areas it cominued to extend frxleral power, making the early Buri~l'I' Court seem almost a third, if sonwwhar ambivalent, phase of the \Xlarren Court. During the 1970s the Burger Court gave constirunonal sanction ro some types of affirmative action, confirmed the broad power of Congress under the FourtL'Ctlth Anwndment, and upheld a substamial, if limited, 1-cmed1al aurllOrity in the federal courts to ordcr local officials to inregrate previously segregated public school districts. In addition, it provided due prncL·ss protections for w<:-Jfare recipients faced with termination ofbendirs and conrinuL·d the Warren Court's efforts to expand the relic{ that injured individuals rnuld obtain under a variuy of federal regulatory statutes.
In three areas the Burger Court's decisions seemed particularly liberal, activist, and nationalist. Firsr, it held rh,lt the Equal Protection Clause applit·d to gender classifications. Congress had hegu11 to address gender Prohibiting the sale of comraceptives ro unmarried persons ,u1d, for more innovative and comrovcrsial, atmounced in Noe! '. \Vi1clc ( 197 ) ) that it ,L'.uarantecd women the right to an abortion. The Burger Courr thus co11firmcd that a 11ew and vibrant "public/private" distinction had L'lltLTed American constirntional law. Unlike the pre-New Deal Court, which had used the distinction to protect property and economic lihnty from ,govcrnlllL'llt regulation, however, the Warren and Burger Courts infused new rneani11g into the dichotomy, usin,g it to protect intimate matters involvi11g sex and \)rocreation from such imerfi.:rence. Finally, the BurgLT Court cxtendl'll the reach of the Eighth Amendment, mandating rnrnimum fnkral standards on horh capital pu11ishment a11d prison com I 1tio11s. I ts ru Ii ngs pt-cvemnl tht• statL·s from executin,g hundreds of condem11nl prisonns, forced rhem to make substantial revisions in their criminal laws, and compclll'll rhc111 to institute a variL·ty of reforms in the administration of' rill'1r correct ions s_Ystcrns. By the 1980s more than 200 stare prisons and ,-\ 'JO local jai Is in forty-three states were operating undn federal court orders.
The growing control that the federal courts exercised over the nation's prisons was only one of the more visible areas in which federal judicial supervision cabined the power of state and local officials. After I3roun the frclernl courts had gradually taken over hundreds of schools in their efforts to ensure that the Court's mandate was enforced. Inspired by their role in combating racial segregation and energized by a burgeoning faith in the judiciary's power to redress social wrongs, the frderal courts grew increasingly willing to rake 011 broader and more complex social problems. Moreover, the explosion of Congressional legislation compelled them in the same direction. Numerous statures created new and sometimes vague rights under many of the cooperative programs that the federal government funded, and those provisions spurred a rapidly expanding range of suits in the national courts against state and local governments. Increasingly, federal judges became active managers of ongoing litigations that sought to reform the srructutTs and procedures of those governments, and they often issued derniled orders establishing federal rules over many areas that Congressional funding had brought within the indirect, but nevertheless effective, control of the national government.
Although national law and national standards had become pervasive by the 1 970s, the states nevertheless remained vital centers of power. For the most part, their laws still controlled many of the most basic areas of American life: marriage, family, education, criminal justice, commercial transactions, zoning and land usage, estate planning and inheritance, the use of automobiles and the highways, and most of the broad common law fields of rort, contract, and property. Indeed, in lawsuits where state law properly controlled, fr·deral constitutional law continued to bind the nariornd courts to follow and apply it. State and local governments, moreover, were heavily involved in providing most services in such basic areas as eduu1-tion, transportation, social welfare, police and public protection, housing and developmental planning, natural resource conservation and usage, and labor relations and employmellt practices. While from 1 950 to I 97 5 the number of federal civilian employees edged up from 2.1 to 2.9 million, the number of state and local government employees jumped from 4.2 to 1 2 mil lion, almost 60 percent of whom were concentrated in the fields of education and health services.
Furrher, stimulated by the federal government's expanded activism, local reformers pushed to modem ize state governments and enhance their administrative capacities. Liberals sought to strengthen their ability to provide greater ranges of social services, while many conservatives hoped that stronger state governments would help check the increasing nationalization rhar marked the post-New Deal decades. From the 1940s through the 197m the states increased their use of professional administrators and drafted expert commissions to frame co11stitutional amendrnu1ts and other structural reforms that would strengthen the insritutio11s of state government. In r 962 only twenty states held annual legislative sessions, for example, bur by the mid r 970s forty-two did so. Influenced by rhe growi11g emphasis on executive leadership that marked the 11acio11al model, sixteen States exte11ded gubernatorial rerrns to four years, and a doze11 eliminated long-established restrictions to allow their ,governors ro serve a second successive term. Further, 11i11etee11 states resrrucrurnl their entire l'Xecurive branches, expanding gubernatorial powers over a varil·ty of budgetary marte rs and giving their governors greater administrative comrol over a wide range of state and local agencies. Moreover, stare employmem, revenues, and cxpendirnres generally expanded relative to those of. local governmem entities, and most states cemralized their administrations by irnposi11g a growing number of requirements and restrictions 011 local government institutions.
Finally, states and localities were able to protect their positio11s in the federal system by exerting persistent and dk·nive pressures 011 the national government. They marshaled their power by establishing a variety oforgani:wrions -i11cluding the National Covernors· Assouation, the National Conference of State I~egislarntTs, the National League of Cities, the lJ.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of· Counties -to influence federal policy and e11sure that national programs were railornl to local needs and interests. Further, by administermg many cooperative sraretederal programs, they were able to help shape their operations and impact. The states, too, retained substantial imkpcndence in thl'ir actions bnause their officials continul'd to be elected directly by thl'ir cirizrns and derived neitlwr office nor authority from rhe national governmem. While thl' states helped elect ft 0 deral officials, thl' fr·dl'ral govcrnrnl'llt lwd 110 such role in State electoral processes. 1 'lk 1960s ended badly for post-New Deal liberalism. Escalating militancy in the civil rights and antiwar movemellts brought mass protests and civil disobedience ro the center of American politics, while the appearance of communes, youth cultures, fi:mmism, sexual f'reedom, gay lilwration, black nationalism, and varieties of· political radicalism f'ucled a growing backlash among older and more conservative Arnerirnns. Three stunning Political assassinations -Presidenr Kennedy; his brother, Robert, a senator and Democratic presidential candidate; and Dr. Martin Luther King, .Jr., the rev<:Ted and despised leader of the civil rights movement -compounded a growing sense of turmoil, division, and crisis.
The events fragmented post-New Deal liberalism. On the level of ideas, the fundamental assumptions that underwrote the regulatory state -faith in science, expertise, and administrative neutrality -seemed increasingly dubious and misconceived. On the level of politics, the war in Vietnam pitted Johnson's Great Society against a rising tide ofantiwar sentiment that increasingly enlisted the support of women, students, liberals, intellectuals, and racial minorities. Those core elements of the Democratic coalition came to view the war as a political betrayal, and an outspoken radical minority transformed the very word "liberal" into a term of derision. At the same time, other key elements of the coalition veered off in the opposite direction. Many white Americans, including urban workers and ethnic Catholics, grew increasingly angry at civil rights advances, antiwar activism, and what they regarded as the social and cultural outrages that exploded in the decade's second half. To make matters worst, organized labor, a central pillar of the Democratic coalition, began shrinking in both membership and influence.
The result was rupture and defeat. In 1968 the anti-war movement drove Johnson from office, and disafliicted Democrats -some by voting Republican and others by abstaining in protest -helped elect Nixon president. Campaigning against crime, radicalism, affirmative action, and the Warren Court itself, Nixon joined leftist radicals in blaming liberalism for the nation's problems. Although the election was close, it marked the beginning of the end of the New Deal order.
If the 1960s had been strife-torn but optimistic, the r97os were strift:-torn and pessimistic. Dominated by the party's left wing, the Democrats lost disastrously in 1972, and the Republicans suffered an equally humiliating blow two years later when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon into the first presidential resignation in the nation's history. The civil rights movement fragmented over both goals and tactics, while white resentments stoked il burning opposition that focused on school busing and affirmative action. The war in Viemam, moreover, came to an excruciating end when the United States withdrew its forces in 197_') and then watched as the Communist North conquered the South, the fanatic Khmer Rouge seized control of neighboring Cambodia, and literally millions of Southeast Asians --many of whom had loyally supported the United States during the war -were murdered, starved to death, or drowned trying to escape. Further, l?.oe 1'. \¥/Cl{/e lx·gan to unite moral traditionalists, Evangelical Protestants, and the Catholic Church in a passionate anti-abortion movement that widened what seemed an unbridgeable moral divide among Americans. At the same time the Yorn Kippur War in the Mideast triggered an Arab oil embargo and drastic price incrl'aSl'S that created a severe tnergy crisis. The result was a steep rcTes,ion and a dehil1tating inflation that lingered into the 1980s. Fundamental economic problems -severe inflation, sharply rising interest rates, high lcvc,Js of unemploymenr, and persistent l"Conomic stagnationcompounded the national downswing. Increasingly, American industry lost out to foreign competition, and in 1971 the nation wirnessed its first trade deficit in almost a century, a deficit that multiplied more· than tenfold by 1981. Finally, a grisly national humiliation capped the decade. Iran, a critical Cold War ally, frll to a violently anti-American Islamic movement that seized the lJnited States embassy and held seventy-six Americans as hostages. Daily television coverage carried anti-American denunciations across the world; and, when a rescue mission failed in early 1980, the nation watched in horror as Iranian radicals gloated over the burnt remains 0 fdead American soldiers and their crashed helicopters.
Those evellts combined to destroy the New Deal order, but they failed to generate a successor regime that was equally stable and well ddined. Tlic, economic depression of the 19yis had confromed the nation with a single and overwhcl rn ing cha! lenge, one that focused atrention and inrcrests on a 11arional effort to revive and reform the economy. In conrrast, the j)sychological dq11-c,sion of the 1970s envelopc,d the nation in a web of amorphous anxieties and multi-cornered conflicts. If rhc earlier depression had pitted business and the wealthy against the u11employed and the middle class, the later one rended to divide Americans into a spli mered mu lri rude of groups identified not only by economic and class position but also by race, age, region, gender, religion, erhniuty, sexual orientation, and pol1tical 1 ckology. The C,milmf Prodm't.1 idea of "discrete am! insular minoriries" seemed to have become the "big bang" of a new and fragnwnti 11g politicocultural universe.
One rl'sult was that both I iberals and conservatives showed a chastened '>ense of limits. Liberals enjoyed their maior successes m opposing the war and cultivating a growing concern with the environnwnt. The former was Premised on the limits of Amcrican powc·r and the latter rn1 rhe limits of industrial society. Conservativc·s enjoyed their grcatesr triumphs in hrin,ging rrad1tional religious ideas and neo-classic economic thinking imo rhe Political rnainstrea;n. The former was based 011 rhe mandate of,: transcendent Cod and the larrc,r on the iron laws of the market. All rdlcned a dee! ining fa 1th in the power of reason, science, and governmc·11t to bend rlw future to the nation's wishes.
\Vluk rhe psychological depression deepened, other forces were beginning to nudge Americans in m,w directions. One was a complex but profound scr of attirnd inal changes: escalating distrust of government, rescntnienr against minorities, hostility toward w<:>lfare programs, rejection of "liberalism" and its regulatory tradition, and a fostering anger directed against challenges to traditional religious and moral ideas -particularly feminism, abortion rights, and gay liberation. A second factor was a longbrewing revitalization of market economics. lc>gether with the general assault on government and scientific expertise, the spreading marker ideology helped turn the nation roward deregulation, privatization, and ,1 renewed faith in the power of private enterprise and the virtue of becoming rich. A third factor was the formation of what appeared to be a new Republican majority based on the merger of the party's traditional supportersespecially business, the well-to-do, rural Amtrica, and the old Anglo-Saxon middle class -with new social ,1sroups, such as Catholics, ethnic whites, disaffected members of the working class, the culturally conservative "solid South," and the growing fi:irces of Evangelical Protestantism.
Drawing the new Republican coalition together was a cultural synthesis that implicitly reversed the values of Cc1ro!e!le Prodmt.1 and post-New Deal liberalism. Disillusioned intellectuals began to articulate a new conservative ideology that called for a return to "authority" and to a social order build solely on "merit." Market theorists developed the idea that politicians responded only to organized interest groups that sought to use government to gain special favors contrary to the common good -'"rent seeking," as they called it. Traditional conservatives and Evangelical groups maintained that secular liberal ism and the welfare state were undermining the nation's moral fiber, family values, and religious foundations. Business interests sought to minimize their legal liabilities and avoid regulatory requirements by claiming that their producrivity was at the mercy of"frivolous" lawsuits brought by dishonest or deluded claimants seeking undeserved windfalls. Property owners and other groups, squt:ezed by recession and angered at government spending on social welfare programs, organized "taxpayer revolts" designed to secure substantial reductions in local, state, and national taxation. Finally, those who harbored resentments against racial and ethnic minorities were angered by the "preferential treatml'nt" that the civil rights laws gave to those whom they considered unable to succeed on their own. Subtly and only half-consciously, those varied attitudes blended i11to a new social persuasion, one rhar saw the weak, disadvantaged, non-conformist, and ill treated as morally unworthy and judged their attempts to secure governmental assistance as trickery and exploitation. Simply put, the ideology of the new Republican coalition transmuted ·'discrete and insular minorities" into "rem-seeking interest groups," the systemically disadvantaged inro the morally unworthy. Conversely, the idt'ology elevated business and the economically successful into exemplars of merit and paladins of the common good. Those groups were not special interests but pillars of economic growth, national might, and moral rectitudt'. Thus, it was appropriate for government to foster business with deregulation and favor the prosperous With tax cuts.
As New Deal liberalism had done, the new conservatism generated and Popularized its own supporting constitutional theories. Rejecting what they considered unlimited Congressional power over the economy and improper judicial activism by the Warren Court, co11servative thinkers sought ro discredit the former with revived ideas of state sovc·reigmy and the latter With rc·strictive ideas about separation of powers. Although they advanced a variety of arguments, often supported by reasoning drawn from market economics, they rallied around the unify111g claim that post-New Deal liberalism had distorted the Consntution and abamlom·d its "original" meaning. Rejecting the idea ofa "living" Constitution, they maimamed that the document's mcaninu was fixed and unchanL'i1w. Those not biased lw lib-
era] nationalism, they charged, could identify the Constitution's aurl1entic meaning by focusing on its text, the "original intent" or "undcrstanding" of its drafters and ratifiers, and the social and moral context that surrounded its adoption.
Edwin Meese 111, who served as attorney general under Republican President H.011ald Reagan in the I ')Sos, emerged as the most prom1m·nt national propo11ent of the new conservative constitutional theory. The fc·deral judiciary was designed to protect federal ism and I im ired govn11menr, Meese insisted, and "'the literal provisions of" the Constitution'" and "rhe original Intentions of those who framed 1t" provided the clear and correct "iudicial st andard" for inrcrprcting its meaning. Castigating rhe "radical l\!--'.alitarianisrn and expansive civil liberrarianism of the Warren Court," he charged that liberal judicial decisions were ··ad hoc" and even "bizarre," often "more policy choices than articulations of const1tutional pr111ciplc." To preserve limited co11stitutional government and construe the C:011stirution properly, the• Court must return to the original imentions of the Founders, "the only reliable guide for judgment.'' Such a rerurn, Meese promised, "would Produce dcfe11sible principles of government that would 11or he tainted hy ickological predilection." Thus, he announcul, it "has been and will continue to lw the pol icy of th is ad 1 ,1 m 1stra ti on to pre,s for a J urispruclence of Original l11te11tion." 17 Although the idea of"original imenr" was an old one a11d, like the theory of Caro/me Prod11c/1, had some merit, 1t suddu1lv he!--'.all to comniaml ,ttte11-tion and inspire devotion because it was -,tgain like Cm!/mc P/"/)d11c1.1 -a highly serviceable tool of constitutional politics. For the nc·w consnvar1ves, l) ~ Ldwi11 Ml'l'.Sl' 111, addrl'ss to thl' J\mcric:111 Har 1\ssmiatio11, .July')-11Ji-1';, rcpri11r,d i11 The Federal i~t Society, '/"lie c;rc11t I )dhtfl: I 11l uj,rt! 111,( 011r \\' 'r;J!t'11 Co, 111 ii 111 i1111 ( \Va-.,hingt 011, De, , 9 Ho), , , 9 , , o.· the idea of original intent provided theoretical grounds for discrediting much of the constitutional law of the preceding half-century, and it justified both attacks on the Warren Court and the demand for justices who would overturn its decisions and restore the "authentic" Constitution. Indeed, the concept of a normative original intent was inherently an instrument of doctrinal disruption and change. Asserting the existence of a "true" constitutional meaning established in a distant past, the idea provided theoretical justification for casting off constitutional imerpretations that had evolved over the subsequent centuries and for rejecting judicial decisions rendered in more recent periods. Equally important, by making eighteemh-and nineteenth-century attitudes the touchstone of constitutional meaning, the idea promised to st1-c11,1.;then the legal and historical arguments that conservatives advanced against the political adversaries they opposed most intensely -those supporting gay rights, abortion, gun control, affirmative action, restrictions on the death penalty, more expansive tort liability, rigid separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad federal anti-discrimination laws.
Influenced by Nixon's four appointees, the Burger Court began to reflect those spreading attitudes. Trumpeting a new concern with what it called "Our Federalism," it increas111gly sought to counter liberal nationalism by limiting the reach of federal law into the operations of state and local ,i.;overnment. It expanded the immunity of government officials from civil rights suits, curtailed remedies for those injured by violations of federal statutes, and narrowed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, it cabined many of the Warn:n Court's criminal law decisions, narrowing both the Fourth Amendrnem exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Although it did not overrule lvlirancla 11. 1\rizo11c1, it repeatedly found ways to shrink its reach. Most commonly, the Court targeted the institutional power of the lower federal courts, developing a variety of procedural restrictions to limit their opportunities for liberal activism. It required them to abstain more frequently in favor of state forums, limited their power to issues writs of habeas corpus to state officials and to order remedies in school desegregation suits, and used the Eleventh Amemlrnent to deny them jurisdiction over suits against states for money dan1agl's.
Although it employed the rhetoric of federalism, the Burger Court seemed increasingly committed to a substantively conservative political ,1genda, especially after the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 198 r. Its decisions, for example, commonly deployed the rhetoric offr·d-eralism rn close the frderal courts to groups that the new Republican coalition had targeted -tort plaintiffs, uvil rights claimants, and state crimin,d clcfcindants. Indeed, when deference to the states led to unpalatable results, the Court ofren balked. In lvlic/11.~c!ll I'. [, rm, ~ ( 198 1 ) S-4 decision, c,·,mic1 /', Sc/// 1\11tr111io J\1ctmj/l/lii,111 'fr,1111il 1\111/,oril) ' ( I 985 ), it upheld an application of the FLSA to a municipal transit system 011 two closely related co11stitutional grounds. One was rhat the Constitution offered "no guidance about where the fromicr between state and foderal Power lies" and, hence, gave the justices "no license to employ freestandin,g conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority Under the Commerce Clause." The other ,ground was a liberal vusion of Original intent, a broad theory of the Franwrs' design: "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the fulernl system lies in the strucrure of the Federal ,govern1ne11t itself.".' In explicit tnms the Courr adopted the reignmg liberal theory that rhe federal system was \lroperly protected not by the Court hut by the "political sate-guards" that the Framers had built into the c011stitutional system. at 87li-77 (BrL"nnan, .J., di"L'ming).
Edu,,m/ A. Pmrn!!. Jr:
Reviving the pre-New Deal views of William Howard 1~1ft and Charles Warren, four Republican appointees dissented vigorously. Justice Lewis F Powell rejected the "political safeguards" theory as both functionally inadequate and constitutionally unfounded, and he insisted that "judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sysrem." Casting a hopeful eye to the future,Justice William H. Rehnquist, Nixon's last appointee and the author of National Leawte, agreed. The principle of state sovereignty, he declared defiantly, '•will, I am confident, in rime again command the support of a majority of this Court. "
21 Little more than a year later Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist Chief] ustice.
Elected president in r 980, Reagan did far more than that. He helped reorient American politics, lead the nation out of the psychological depression of the r97os, and inspire a crystallizing Republican majority in its drive for national dominance. That coalition reelected Rea,~an in r984, put two other Republicans -George Bush in 1988 and George W. Bush in 2000 -in the presidency, and forced Democrat Bill Clinton to move his party substantially to the right in order to scratch together two presidential victories in the 1990s. Equally important, the new Republican coalition steadily increased the party's strength in Congress, which the Democrats had dominatt'd since the Great Depression. After 1980 the Republicans frequently controlled the Senate, and in 1994 they won control of the House, a position they retained to century's end.
Reagan established both the rhetoric and direction of the new ent. "[G}overnment is not the solution to our problc:m," he announced. "Government i.1 the problc:m." 22 His greatest success came in reshaping the parameters of public debate and establishing the values of the new Republican coalition -religious traditionalism, suspicion of government, faith in business and the free market, and opposition to welfare, abortion, homosexuality, and affirmative action -at the center of American politics. His administration pursut'd four principal policies: business deregulation, tax cuts weighed in favor of the wealthy, ht'avy increases in military spending, and a balanced budget. In large part it delivered 011 the first three and, likely by design, failed on the fourth -a result that led to skyrocketing fcdernl deficits and, consequently, to intensifying pressures to cut federal domestic spc:nding on welfare and othc:r social programs. Further, Reagan, who had opposed both the Civil Rights Act of r964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, altered the position of the federal government on civil rights issues. l !is administration opposed affirmative action and school busing, and it The Co!frtJ. Federc1lis111. ,md the I'eclew! Crmst it11t io11. r cpo-2000 T 65 slackcned subsra11tially fcxleral efforts to enforce the national civil rights laws.
Proclairni11g a11other "New Federalism," Reaga11 sought to restructure the system far more suhsta11tially than Nixon had attempted. Nixon's "new federal ism" had unbraced the idea o/" active government. Accepting the need for massive federal spe11di11g it had attempted to make governmc11t l17ore responsive and dticic11t by decentralizing rna11agen1cnt. Its primary l17ethod was to ahando11 highly restrictive categorical grants 111 favor of block gra11rs and general tTvenue sharing, thereby rnai11ta111ing the flow of funds to stare and local governments hut with far kwer federal use restrictio11s. 111 contrast, Rea,t.;,lll rejected revenue sharing and, more important, sought to l1li11i111ize or terminate federal financing and supervisio11 in as many areas as possible. I !is goal was to shrink governnwnt at all levels. Although his l1lost ambitious federalism proposals failed, he succeeded in ending revenue sharint.; and reducing fr·dcral grants to state and local governments. During the 1 ~8os funding "ror wclfa,re programs fell, and f{·dcral grants to stat,e and local government dropped by 25 percent. A!011g similar lines, Reagan substantially reduced k·dcral supervision over state and local governments. Hi, ad Ill inistration adopted adrn i nistrative procedures to slow the growth of federal rule making and al tern! many existing rc,t.;ulations to al low the states greater discretion and to relieve them of· cosrly n:pornng requirements. It consolidated seventy-seven categorical programs into nine broad lilock grams, for example, conden,ing and simplifying a wide range of" rules and rc•striuions. In social terms, the weak and disadvamagcd, both the working and non-working poor, bore the hardships and deprivat l(HlS of"his federal isrn reforms.
In spite of" its cornmitmcnt to dccemralization, however, the Reagan adn1inistration readily embraced federal power when necessary to advance Its political objectives. While in most case, -welfare spending and civil rights enforcement, fcir example -curtailing frderal activism served its social purposes, there were exceptions. When business 111terests advocatn! hoth uniform national standards to open more miks of highway to larger trucks and a national product liability law restricting consumer rights, Reagan supported the proposals in spite of the Lin that they required kderal Prcen1ption of state laws in areas of traditional state control. Similarly, his adn1in1stration readily advocated national standards in its dforr to impose Workfare requ1rune11ts on stare welfare programs, extend kderal criminal law to ti,ght a variety of social evils, and defeat the affirmative anion progran1s that dozens of state and local governments had cs tab! ished.
Indeed, although Republican administrations from Nixon to the second George Bush formally upheld the banner of federalism, all rnnrributnl to the further centralization of American government. In domestic matters they joined Democrats in expanding national involvement in such traditional state areas as education and family relations, and they pushedagainst determined Democratic opposition -to nationalize clements of tort law in order to restrict suits against business and governnwm. Further, they helped frderalize ever larger realms of the criminal law. Indeed, by 1996 more than 40 percent of all federal criminal statutes had been enacted since Nixon's election in 1968. Similarly, the Republicans steadily reinforced the expansion of presidential power and the prioritization of military and forei,~n policy concerns. That persistent emphasis impinged on the states by centralizing issues of paramount public concern, expanding the de facto scope of frderal authority, and divcrti ng resources from domestic programs that the states helped control to the military and national security institutions that operated under exclusive fr·deral authority. Ironically, the end of the Cold War between r 989 and 1991 seemed to lead only to rapid international desrabil ization, further magnification of foreign pol icy anxieties, and an ever greater concentration of power and discretion in the federal executtve.
By the end of the 1 980s the successive achievements of post-New De,tl liberalism and the decentralization efforts that began after , 969 had combined to alter and in some ways strengthen the nation's ft.:deral system. The former accomplished three critical results. First, compcllin,~ the stares to redistrict their legislatures, post-New Deal liberalism increased urban representation in many states and helped create new legislative coalitions that began to address the pressing problems that earlier rural-dominated legislatures had ignored. Second, it brought the franchise to African Americans in the South and forced broad non-discrimination policies on all states. The result was to ensure fairer treatment for minority groups and to begin mitigating abuses that had long tarnished the claim of states' rights. Third, federal matching grants stimulated new social programs and spurred many states to modernize and professionalize their governmental structures. Between 1 965 and r 980, for example, twenty-two states redesigned their executive branches; the number of state employees who worked under mcri t systems rose from 50 to 75 percent. Similarly, thirty-four ,rates reorganized and expanded their court systems, and all fifty established offices of court administration to address caseload hurdt·ns and increase judicial dliciency.
Those achievements substantially enhanced the ability of the states to handle the consequences of the new decentralization that began in the 1970s. On one level, the decentralization effort made the national government rnore responsivc to state complaints about bureaucratic waste and unnecessary administrative burdens. The result was the elimination or simplification of many fr·deral regulatory procedures and a greater flexibility at the state and local levels in shaping government programs. On a second level, dcce11tralizatio11 allowed srates to rake greater co11trol over the programs they adm Ill istercd a11d encouraged them to modernize their adm i 11 istrativc structures and use their c11hanced capaci tics to initiate new programs and approaches of their own. Bcgi1111i11g in the 1970s the states emharknl 0 11 a range of new i11itiatives to expand social services, improve fi11ancial capabilities, attract outside investment, develop energy and conservation programs, a11d reform their public education and criminal Justice systems. On a third level, the decentralization movemellt revived rhe idea oi' the States as laboratories that could attempt valuable social experin1ems. The st ares began to look ro one another-rather than to the fc·deral governmentfor new ideas a11d teclrniqucs, and with increasing frequency they borrowed from the approaches rhat their sister states had tried and fou11d effrcrive.
Wisconsin exemplified both the era's new srate activism and its growi11g social conservatism. 111 the century's early decades \X/isconsi11 had pioneered many progressive social measures, and in the 1 990s it emerged once more as an innovative force, this time in developing restrictive ·'workfare" programs designed to reduce taxes, curtail welfare coverage and be11dirs, and compel recipienrs quickly to fi11d privare employment. Its approach c11couragnl conservative attacks on the federal welfare system and not only influencnl Other states but also had an impact at the 11atio11al level. l11 19,y{i Wiscons111 again stood as a paragon of laboratory fr·,k:ralism when the fr.demi governrnent invoked its experience i11 substanrially revamping the narion's welfare law. A m011umenral fc:deral welfare reform act c·ncoura;,;nl rhe wider use of Workfare requirements, clirninatnl some 11atio1ial programs, expandl"d the Use of block grants, and al lowed the stares greater leeway i II shaping t he1 r 0 wn systems.
In spite of rhe decentralization efforts, however, governmental power at the national level remained decisive. That facr was nowlll're more appare11t than in the movement to replace welfare wirh workfare. Although \X/isconsin illustrated a renewed vitality in state governments, the welfare reform law that Congress enacted in 1996 demomtrated that the f<.-deral governn1e11t remained the paramoum force in csrablish1ng national wt"lfare policy. 'fhc an not only required the adoption of workfare policies, hut ir also con1pclk·d the stares to comply with a 11u111bcr of other rigorous fr.deral mandates, including the imposition of rime lirrnts on el1g1hility, rnluction or wirhl10ldi11g of hendirs for certain classc·s of rnipicms, rcportin,;,; Procedures involving the parcrnity ,llld i111111igrati011 status of undnagc bcnl'ficiaries, and the development of various centralized procedures for administering key clements of state welfare programs.
Contemporaneous developments in the state courrs suggested similar conclusions about the continuing dominance of national standards. Those courrs had authority to construe rheir own state const1 tutions, and rhcy were free in most cases to establish broader individual rights and liberties than the U.S. Supreme Court recognized under the Federal Constitution. Not surprisingly, then, in the r 970s liberals reacted to the narrowing constitutional decisions of the Burger Court by urging the state courts rouse their indcpcndem authority to counteract irs decisions by cxpanding individw1l rights under their separate state constitutions. Some responded, and a number of stare judges invoked their authority to establish rights broader than those recognizt:d in federal law. The liberal appeal to state judicial powt:r, however, brought only limited and scattc·red results. For tht: most part state courts spurnt:d their opportunities and in the ovcrwhdming majority of relevant cast:s chost: either to rely on frdnal constitutional law directly or to conform state constitutional law to the contours of federal law. Indeed, when the courts of Cal ifomia and Florida refused to follow decisions of the Burger Court, they were abruptly reigned in. Both states responded with constitutional amendments that required their state courts to bring tht:ir interprt:tations of certain state constitutional provisions into conformity with the decisions of tlit: U.S. Supremt: Court.
The relativdy conformist behavior of the state courts suggested sevt:nd interrelated conclusions about American fr·dt:ralisrn in the late twentieth ct:ntury. One was that undcrly111g social, cultural, and economic forces were continuing relentlessly to centralize national affairs. ln spite of the swdling paeans to fodcralism, Americans were ever more commonly advancing their val ut:s and policies as properly "national" in scope. Although they frequently and sometimes bitterly disputed rhe naturt: of the values that were proper, they nevertheless insisted ever more stridently that their own valueswhatever they were -be given national recognition. The second conclusion was that the U.S. Supreme Court was playing an ever more prominent and important role in public affairs. To a growing number of Americans it was the truly "supreme" authority that could and should rulc on all major issues that faced the nation. Americans were beginning to view the Court, in other words, as they had come to view the presidency -as an institution that should address not only problems that were properly "national" in some antecedent and technical co11stitutional sense but also all issues that had become, as a practical fact of everyday life, important to the nation as a whole. A third conclusion was that the concept of"federalism" had lost most of its substalltive meaning as an mdependent normative guide to the distribution of governmental powers. While theories of federalism continued to proliferate and activists of all stripes persisted in invoking the concept's authoriry, little remained of the idea that could not readily bt: turned to partisan use by able and designing hands. The fourth and last conclusion was that a politically conservative and socially ungenerous mood had come to pervade political attitudes across the nation. The state courts properly Federal Co11.1tit11lio11, 1 c;2n--2000 1 (i9 followed the U.S. Supreme C:ourr, many Americans sc<:'mcd to believe, not just because it was the authoritative voice of the national Constitution but also because it was -with a fi_,w glaring exceptions -moving that law, for the time at least, in the general directions they considered desirable.
Although the Court increasingly reflected the values of the 1ww Republican coalition, Reagan and his successors failed to transform the Supreme Court as quickly or completely as the New Deal had done. lktwec11 19_ 1 5 and 1969 the Democrats had controlled the presidency for twenty-eight of thirty-six years, the Senate for al I but four of those years, and both together for twenty-four years. Conversely, in the decades after 1 968 the Republicans controlled borh the presidency and the Senate simultaneously for only six years, 1981 through 1987, a period in which only two vacancies occurred. Thus, Republican nominations were commonly subject to Democratic check. Then, further d ii uri ng thci r drive for control, during the 1 990s
Clinton was able to add two moderate liberals to the Court.
Even though Republican presidents were responsible for ten of the twelve Justices placed on the Court after 19(i8, their new appointees failed to form a consistently united bloc. Indeed, only three of them pushed aggressively and relentlessly to implement the values of the new Republican coalition. In contrast, three others edged 111to the Court's moderate-to-liberal wing, and the remaining four were often cautious and respectful of precedent, rather than ideological and ardent for change. As borh conservatives and 0 Pponenrs of judicial activism, the moderate four may havl' fc·lc thernsclves bound to honor the principle of.11,;re deu11J and to rcmaill for rhc most part Within existing constitutional challnels. Thus, a comhillarion of external chccks, internal barriers of role alld doctrint', and differing jurisprudenrial orit'ntations prevented abrupt change in many areas.
Although a variety of obstacles slowed Republicall efforts to remake the federal judiciary, the party's determined drive nevertheless beg,m to bri11g increasingly substantial results by the late 1980s. Methodically appomting ideologically sympathetic judges, Reagan and Bush increasillgly turned the lower frderal judiciary toward the values of the new Rcpublirnll coalitirn1. Far more visibly, they did the same to the Supreme Court. Reagan markedly changed its direction when he elevated Rehnquist to the cenrcr chair Ill T986 and then added conservative Justices Antonin Scalia alld Anthony Kennedy to the bench. Then, when Bush replaced liberal.Justice Thurgood Marshal 1, the last survivor of the Warren Court, with the rigidly consnvative J List ice Clarence Thomas in 1991, he established a relatively firm five-justice conservative bloc that began to an with increasing boldness.
In the name of frderalism the new majority took particular aim at the Powers of Congress, and in the century's last eight years it voided at least ten Congressional statutes Oil frderal ism groullds. In LI 11i1ed St11/e.1 1·. l-11/1e:: ( 1995) , the five-justice bloc voided the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a crime knowingly to possess a gun near a school. The decision seemed to limit the Commerce Clause to formally "economic" activities that Congress could show were directly related to interstate commerce. Five years later in U nitecl Stet/es l'. Morri.1011 (2000 the same five justices relied on Loj1ez to void a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that created a federal remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. Such violence, the Court explained, was "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.""' Similarly, the Court deployed the judicially created doctrine of standing to trump Congressional power to enforce federal environmental laws through private lawsuits, and it even suggested doctrinal grounds for possible fi_1ture use in enforcing limits on the spending power.
More pointedly, reacting against national regulation of state and lonil governments, the Court severely constrained frderal power over the states themselves. First, in 1996 it held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress from using its commerce power to create claims against states, and thn:'e years later it extended that holding to all of Congress's Article I powers. Second, it narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment for the same purpose. Although the Court did not challenge the principle that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity whe11 legislating under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it created severe limitations on the power and invalidated a series of' Congressional statutes that imposed liabilities on states for violating federal civil rights statutes. Finally, the Court f'urthcr insulated the states from federal power by developin,l( an "anticommandeering" principle that forbad Congress from requiring states or their officials to assist in implementing federal regulatory programs.
Although the Rehnquist Court revived the Tenth Amendment, it did not use it to remove a broad category of "Joni!" activities from federal authority as the Taft Court had clone in Drexel f11mit11re. Rather, in the spirit of Nation,d LM,~llf, it employed the amendment more narrowly and seemed primarily interested in protecting the operations and institutions of the state governments themselves. Its decisions restricting the lower foderal judiciary paralleled its decisions limiting Congressional power. The Rehnquist Court curtailed federal habeas corpus, shrank remedial authority over institutional reform suits, and narrowed substantive liabilities under federal statutory and constitutional provisions in order to minimize federal Judicial intervention in the operations of state and local governments.
Beyond insulating state governments, the Rehnquist Court's decisions limiting Congressional power seemed targeted primarily at civil rights legislation. Its Commerce Clause decisions limited Congressional authority to activities that were primarily "economic;" its Section 5 decisions struck directly at the principal Congressional power specifically designed ro prot('ct disadvantaged social groups. Politically, then, the Court's efforts to constrain Congress seemed to reflect rhe social and cultural strains of the new H.epublican coalition more than its free marker and business-oriented aS]XTtS.
The Rehnquist Court's lack of sympathy with the federal civil rights laws was apparent. Immediately after the last Reagan appoi11t<.'l' took his sear i11 1 <J88, ir issued a stunning scriL·s of decisions that method1cally narrowed rhe uvil rights laws and restricted the remedies available for their violation. I ts decisions struck most ruthlessly ar affirmative action programs and employment discrimination law. Revealingly, when the Court dealt With affirmative action, it readily set aside its goal of insulating the states and imposed federal constitutional restrictions on their power to establish such programs.
Th<: political sig11ilicancc of the Court's civil rights decisions was clear. Si11ce I ')68 Repuhl ica11s had dqiloyed the language of federal ism to shape a "Southern strategy" that sought white votes by opposing uvil rights activism allll, in particular, affirmative action programs. The Reagan administration had followed the same course, imensifying rhe rhetoric, limiting cnforcenwm of the civil rights laws, and -for the first rime si11ce llrou·11 -bringing the fc:deral goveinment into court to oppose civil rights claims. Then, in 1 <J88 Reagan's vice president, (;corgc Bush, was elcnnl presidu1r after a campaig11 rhar prornis<:d "law and order" and featured a notorious tckvision advntisement rhat was widely perceived to be racist. When rhe Democratic Congress attempted to pass legislation to coumcr the Relrnquist Court's civil rights decisions, Bush vetoed one bill and then compelled Congress to weaken another before signing it. The Rehm1uisr Court's civil rights decisions fit snugly with the Republican program.
Nor surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court also followed the Reagan a11d Bush administrations in asserting national authority to enforce other vallies of the Republican coalition. Joining the effort to restrin tort claims against husl!less, it readily displaced state law when fr·dcral rules served the Purpose. Similarly, it expanded fr·deral power under the Due Process and 'Etkings Clauses, l1111irnl state power rn cnforc<: environmental regulano11s, and applied a broad First An1e11dment righr or association to allow large private organizations ro exclude homosexuals. Indeed, in decisions protecr-'11g private property, it again set state authoriry aside by im11osing a federal constitutional duty on states to provide tax rdi.mds Ill certain cases and, further, suggested rhar the 'fakmgs Clause might override star<: sovereign However sound thl:' Court's premisl:'s a11d conclusion, at century's C:'nd the fundamental -and operational -questions remained as they had been ever since 1 78sr What specific vision of kderal ism should he adoptecL' What specific limits should he enfcJrcecL' Which governments --and which branches of government -should be subject to fednalism's limitatirn1s 1 For what purposes, and in whose interests' CONCLUSION AMERICAN FIDERALISM AT CliNTllRY'S FND The twemicth cenrury ended, almost literally, wirh limb 1·. (,'01·e (2oorJ) .
There, the five-justice Rehnquist majority asserted a quesrirnwhlc jurisdiction to determine who would win the presidential elccrion of 2000 and then, on sharply colltested grounds, rull:'d in favor of Republican George W. Bush.
In the most dramatic manner possible the decision rl:'vealed two fundamental characteristics of American fr·dcralism. First, it demonstrated the· extent to which the Supreme Court had n1oved to a position of institutional centrality in American government. In troubled elections 111 1800 and r824 the I louse of Representatives had follownl constitunonal provisions in determining who would be the next prcsidcm. In the bitterly disputed tkcrion of 1870 a speual extra-constitutional ccrn11nission composed of hve representatives each from the Senate, I louse, and Supreme Court had convened to i-csolve the same issue. Notwithstanding prior practice, co11-stitutio11al clauses, and statutory provisions that suggested Congress or the st ate legislature as the authoritative 111stitutio11, the Court stL·ppnl imo the disputed elecrion of 2000 and dcudcd the outcome. Alone. No hrallch of Congress sought to intervene or participate, and no branch of state government moved to oppose. Deeply and closely divided, the nation acceptnl the C:ourr's decisive roll:' as practically necessary and co11stitutio11ally proper.
B11.1h 1: Gore capped the Rehnqu1.st Court's basic institmional achieverncnr: confirming the evolutio11 of the role a!ld authority of the federal judiciary -and, ;iarticularly, the Supreme Court itself~ that h«d occurred 0 vn the previous century or longer. That evolution had elevated the C:ourc, With the lower j ud iuary as its wide-reaching arms, co a position of· sweepi 11,g 1 nstitutio11al authority. Repeatedly, the Rehnquist Court insisted that 1t
Was the final arbiter of rhe Constitution, and it hrou,gllt llL'W viral1ry ro the Warren Court's pronouncernenr of Judicial authonty in Coojh'/' 1·. !Lmw. "It is the responsibility of this C:ourt, nor Congress, co define the suhstame of constitutional guarancees," 21 it declared in shrinking Congressional power and asserting its own primacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Not surprisi11gly, the Rehnquist Court exceeded the Warren Court in the rate at which it held federal as well as state actions unconstitutional.
Second, l31/.\h I'. Gore exempli tied the shifting, contested, and instrumentalist nature of American federalism. Although some oft he legal issues were novel, the decisive constirnrional issue was stark: did authority to settle the matter reside at the state or national leveP Unlike the many cases in which rhe ideology of the new Republican coal1rion coincided with deference to the states, in 1311.1h z•. Gore the two conHicced. The Jive-justice majority bloc rushed to trump state sovereignty with national power. "[T}he fedend government is not bad but good," one of the majority justices had cold a const'rvative audience some two decades earlier before ascending to the Courr. "The trick is to use it wisely."
'
As the twentieth century ended, L311Jh z: Gore stood as a monument to the dynamics of American federalism, the system's paradigmatic case.
Thus, in spite of the many changes that reshaped the system and restructured its opt:rations, American federal ism closed the twentieth century much as it had begun it, as a somnvhat disjointt:d a11d malleable, but neverthelt:ss stablt: and democratic, systt'm of governmenr with the capacity to confront new problems a11cl adapr to nt:w conditions. A variety of social and cul rural factors sustaim·d its working order: a strikinp;ly diverse population that e11joycd prosperity, education, and freedom; a variety of frirrnal and i11formal checks that helped coumt:r concentrated powt'r; the mgrained social values, cultural habits, and institutional practices that constituted the natio11·s viral, if inherently human, rule of law; and a sustaining popular faith that the nation was committed, ultimately if quite imperfectly, to rhe lofty ideals it formally proclaimed. American federalism maintained itself in the twentieth century not because the Constitution set forth bright lint:s that defined state and federal power or because the Court articulated its own consistent and unchanging rules but because the system's complex operations were shaped and constrained by that social, cultural, and institutional base.
-'i 1\11tot1i11 Scalia, "Thl' 'hvo 1:acl's ol !'cdcralism, " lf, m'drd.f111m1(!/ o//., 111'dll(( JJ11h/1( i'oli1) () (ll)H2), [(), 22.
